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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT            




On February 19, 2003, the New York State legislature received 
a proposed amendment to the state constitution advocating the 
elimination of the unanimity requirement for juries in criminal 
cases.1 The sponsors of the amendment believe eliminating the 
unanimity requirement “will produce more convictions and put 
                                                          
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A. Cornell University, 1996. The 
author would like to thank his wife, Katharine, for her encouragement and 
inspiration. He also would like to thank the Journal of Law and Policy staff for 
their hard work. Special thanks to Cory Shindel, Skye Phillips, and Professor 
Jason Mazzone for their patience and helpful comments. 
1 Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). New York’s right to a jury 
trial is protected in Article I, § 2 of the New York Constitution. Section 2 states 
in pertinent parts: “Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been 
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever . . . . The 
legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not 
less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. The 
resolution presented to the General Assembly proposes changing Section 2 to 
read: “The legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be 
rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case or 
misdemeanor, and not less than three-fourths of the jury in any felony case.” 
Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (emphasis added). As of 
September 2004, the bill had been sent to the Attorney General for comments 
and was under review by the Judiciary Committee. See NEW YORK STATE 
ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. 
(2003). 
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more criminals behind bars.”2 This is not the first time such a 
change has been proposed in New York.3 Currently, New York and 
several other states do not require unanimous verdicts in civil 
cases.4 Fortunately, most states have not taken this approach in 
criminal trials.5 If accepted by New York’s General Assembly, this 
move would be an alarming and dangerous step in the anti-jury 
movement sweeping the country.6 
                                                          
2 NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF Assemb. 
4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (2003) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM]. 
3 Id. A similar amendment was rejected in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 
2001. Id. See also People v. Sanabria, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1964) (reviewing the 1931 New York legislature’s debate over proposals to 
require less than unanimous verdict in jury trials). 
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (2003); see also UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10 (2003) 
(three-fourths of jurors); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6 (2003) (five-sixths of the jury); 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7 (2003) (three-fourths); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23 (2004) 
(“number required to render a verdict, shall be specified by law”); MONT. 
CONST. art. II, § 26 (2002) (two-thirds of the jury). In all, 34 states allow non-
unanimous jury verdicts in civil trials. PAULA L. HANNAFORD ET AL., NAT’L 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? (2002), available 
at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesPub.pdf 
(citing STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1998, Table 42 (Trial Juries: Size and 
Verdict Rules)). 
5 Only Oregon and Louisiana allow for majority verdicts in felony cases. 
HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (citing LA. CODE CRIM PROC. Art. 782 
(2004) (stating that in “[c]ases in which punishment is necessarily confinement 
at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom 
must concur to render a verdict”) and OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2003) 
(providing “the verdict of a trial jury in a criminal action shall be by concurrence 
of at least 10 of 12 jurors [and] [e]xcept when the state requests a unanimous 
verdict, a verdict of guilty for murder or aggravated murder shall be by 
concurrence of at least 11 of 12 jurors.”). Oklahoma eliminated the unanimity 
requirement in misdemeanor trials. Id. 
6 See, e.g., Charles W. Joiner, From the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN 
AMERICA 149-50 (Rita James Simon, ed., Sage Publications 1975) (suggesting 
that a verdict of ten out of twelve jurors would be sufficient); Robert Boatright 
& Elissa Krauss, A Report on the First National Meeting of the Ever-Growing 
Community Concerned With Improving the Jury System, 86 JUDICATURE 145 
(Nov.-Dec. 2002); Tom M. Dees, III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction? A 
Discussion of Jury Reform, 45 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1789-1804 (2001); Paula L. 
Hannaford & G. Thomas Munsterman, Reshaping The Bedrock of Democracy: 
American Jury Reform During the Last 30 Years, 36 NO. 4 JUDGES’ J. 5 (1997); 
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In recent years, some state legislatures have discussed 
measures that would curtail the jury’s power,7 while other states, 
                                                          
Jere W. Morehead, A “Modest” Proposal for Jury Reform: The Elimination of 
Required Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 933, 933-34 (1998) 
(“[A]pparent failures of the citizen jury in recent years . . . has called into 
question the function of this important constitutional guarantee . . . .”). 
7 See Sandra D. Jordan, The Criminal Trial Jury: Erosion of Jury Power, 5 
HOW. SCROLL 1, 1-2 (2002). Tom Dees includes in his appendix jury reform 
recommendations from Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, 
New York, and Texas. California’s jury reform included suggestions to amend 
the state constitution to allow juries of eight or less for misdemeanor cases and 
to allow nonunanimous verdicts in felony cases where the jury has deliberated 
more than six hours. Dees, supra note 6, at 1795. See also J. Clark Kelso, Final 
Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1442-45, 1488-1501 (1996); Jeremy Osher, Note & 
Comment, Jury Unanimity in California: Should It Stay or Should It Go?, 29 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1323-25, 1336-38 (1996) (discussing California’s 
attempt to eliminate the unanimity requirement). See generally The National 
Center for State Courts website, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/ 
Publications/KIS_JurInnStatesPub.pdf. It is interesting to note that in 1990 New 
York also considered a proposal to eliminate the constitutional protection of 
grand juries. NEW YORK STATE SENATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SENATE 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (1990). Proponents of this measure argued 
that the grand jury was an outdated and antiquated institution, which no longer 
served a valuable purpose in society. MICHAEL COLODNER & MATTHEW T. 
CROSSON, DRAFT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE CONCURRENT 
RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO 
ARTICLE I AND VI OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (on file with author). In addition, 
they claimed that since the federal constitution did not protect the grand jury, 
New York should not protect it in its state constitution. Id. Testifying at the Joint 
Legislative Hearing of the Senate Committee on Codes and the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Susan N. Herman argued against this 
proposal and based her argument on an historical analysis of the grand jury in 
New York. Proposals to Amend Provisions of the New York State Constitution 
and the New York Criminal Procedure Law Concerning Right to Indictment by 
Grand Jury Before the Senate Committee on Codes and the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 1990 Leg. (NY 1990) (statement of Professor Susan N. 
Herman, Brooklyn Law School) (on file with author). After months of hearings 
on the subject, the legislature decided against enacting the proposal and instead 
chose to focus on ways to make the grand jury process more efficient. ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, supra at 4-5. 
Although these debates focused on the grand jury and occurred over ten years 
ago, the same issues arise in today’s debate regarding jury reform. Considering 
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including New York, have initiated jury reform programs aimed at 
improving the operation of the existing jury system.8 Fueling these 
initiatives are publicized jury nullification actions such as the O.J. 
Simpson case,9 instances of hung juries, such as the Dennis 
Kozlowski-Tyco trial,10 and the general perceptions of legislators, 
judicial officers, and prospective jurors that the jury system is 
ineffective in its present form.11 Critics of the jury system question 
whether juries presently provide a vital service to our judicial 
                                                          
that the grand jury and the petit jury share similar characteristics and historical 
origins, Professor Herman’s argument and her emphasis on the historical aspects 
of the right are informative and particularly relevant to the debate on jury 
reform. 
8 Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals appointed 
a commission in the Spring of 2002 to conduct a thorough review of the jury 
system and come up with ways to improve its operation. Press Release, New 
York State Court System, Court System Launches Second Phase of the Jury 
Reform in New York (June 17, 2004) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/press. The commission released an interim report in 
June 2004 and it is available at http://www.jury commission.com/pr2004_11.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005). See also Judith S. Kaye & Albert M. Rosenblatt, 
Introduction to Special Edition on Juries, 73 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (June 2001); 
Anthony Ramirez, Courts Plan to Waste Less of Jurors’ Time, N.Y. TIMES, June 
18, 2004 at B3; Susan Saulny, Jury Duty? Prepare for Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2003, at B1, B5. For a discussion of other states’ reform movements, see 
supra note 7. See also Arizona Governor Signs ‘Jury Patriotism Act’; ALEC 
Model Bill Becomes Law, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
3731352; Robbi Hess, Rochester Attorney Appointed to NY State Commission 
on the Jury, DAILY RECORD (Rochester, NY), July 30, 2003, available at 2003 
WL 16077082; Jane Spencer, Courts Try to Make Jury Duty More Palatable, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2004, at D1. 
9 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Opinion, Protect the Jury System, 
Judge Was the Problem, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at M6 (defending the O.J. 
Simpson jury). 
10 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Tyco Mistrial: The Overview; Tyco 
Trial Ends as Juror Cites Outside Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at A1 
(discussing the result of the Tyco trial); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jonathan D. 
Glater, Criminal Intent Seems the Focus of Juror’s Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2004 at C1, C6 (discussing the controversy surrounding the lone dissenting juror 
in the Tyco case) 
11 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 8, at D1 (discussing “recent controversies 
involving jurors in the Tyco, Martha Stewart and World Trade Center cases” 
and initiatives states are taking to solve these problems). 
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system and whether they even have the ability to provide this 
service.12 These critics also debate whether the common law right 
to a jury should continue to receive constitutional protection at the 
state level.13 
Many critics assert that the best way to address problems such 
as jury nullification and instances of hung juries would be to 
eliminate the unanimity requirement.14 Unfortunately, as evidenced 
by the proposed constitutional amendment, many New Yorkers 
                                                          
12 See Jordan, supra note 7, at 1-2 (stating that “[t]he American jury is in 
serious trouble” and that “segments of society believe that twelve ordinary 
citizens are not equipped to make important decisions”); Graham C. Lilly, The 
Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (2001) (discussing 
some of the problems faced by juries in adapting to modern litigation); Douglas 
G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1997). See also THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA (Rita 
James Simon ed., Sage Publications 1975); RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE 
AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM (2003); WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE 
PEOPLE (2002); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of 
Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 927 (1994) 
(providing a brief history of the criminal jury in the United States and 
concluding that “[o]nly a shadow of this communitarian institution has 
survived”); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169 (1995) (presenting several ideas for improving the jury 
system). 
13 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359 (1972) (holding that a 
conviction based on a 9-3 jury verdict did not violate defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) 
(upholding a conviction based on an 11-1 jury verdict as it did not violate the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970) (holding jury not required to consist of twelve people); Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 186-89 (1968) (Harlan J., dissenting) (arguing that 
trial by jury is not a requisite of due process and states should be allowed to 
experiment with other methods of adjudicating guilt); MEMORANDUM, supra 
note 2. See generally Amar, supra note 12; Jordan, supra note 7, at 1-2. 
14 See e.g., Amar, supra note 12, at 1189-92 (1995) (presenting four 
arguments in support of eliminating the unanimity requirement); Richard H. 
Menard, Jr., Note, Ten Reasonable Men, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 179 (2001) 
(suggesting eliminating the unanimity requirement would reduce incidents of 
hung juries); Morehead, supra note 6 (proposing the elimination of the 
unanimity requirement for jury verdicts); Osher, supra note 7 (discussing 
California’s attempts to eliminate the unanimity requirement). 
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share these sentiments.15 However, the elimination of the 
unanimity requirement in New York would be another step toward 
making New York’s right to a jury trial conform to the right as 
protected in the U.S. Constitution.16 If achieved, this alignment 
would eliminate the important distinctions between the New York 
right and the federal right. 
The New York right to a jury trial derives from the common 
law right and, thus, reflects the political and social development of 
New York State.17 The federal right, however, stems from a 
political compromise between the federalists and anti-federalists, 
and serves as a symbol of our federalist system of government. In 
fact, the right to a jury trial is a central feature of our federalist 
system.18 Therefore, in addition to eliminating the distinctive 
characteristics of the New York right, altering the right would 
upset the balance of our federalist system of government.19 
Furthermore, eliminating the unanimity requirement and 
altering the right to a jury trial as it is protected in the New York 
Constitution would detract from the dual role the jury serves in our 
federalist system. New York’s colonial history reflects the jury’s 
function as both a political institution belonging to the people and 
as a protector of individual liberties. The proposed amendment 
threatens to reduce the jury’s ability to fill both of these roles. 
Thus, before New York politicians respond to critics’ frustrations 
and attacks on the jury system by eliminating the unanimity 
requirement or making other alterations to the right to a jury, they 
should first consider the origins of the right to a jury trial in this 
country and its particular significance in New York’s history. 
This note argues that, despite sharing a common historical 
origin, the federal right to a jury trial and the New York right are 
                                                          
15 See MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. 
16 For a discussion of the right to a jury trial in the U.S. Constitution see 
infra Part I. 
17 See infra Part II and Part III (reviewing the history of the right to a jury 
in New York). 
18 See infra Part I (discussing the role of the jury and the drafting of the 
U.S. Constitution). 
19 See infra Part.I.B. (describing the efforts to protect the right to a jury in 
the Constitution). 
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fundamentally distinct with regard to the role each plays in 
government and society. Because of these differences and the 
unique role that the jury played in New York’s political roots, New 
York should offer more protection to the right than is provided 
under the U.S. Constitution.20 This note also argues that the 
consistent protection of the right to a jury trial in New York’s 
constitution and the continued respect shown for it by New York 
courts and the state legislature suggest that the right to a jury trial 
in criminal cases is a fundamental right and, thus, should not be 
altered.21 Part I of this note provides a brief historical overview of 
the origin of the right to a jury trial in the United States. Part II 
discusses the origin of the right in New York, tracing the colonial 
development of the right from its first appearance in a code handed 
down in 1665 by New York’s first colonial governor, to its 
incorporation into New York’s constitution. Part III examines the 
various New York constitutions and their consistent protection of 
the right to a jury trial. Next, part IV analyzes how the right has 
changed on a national level through a historical review of 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution and seminal decisions by the 
U.S. Supreme Court that altered the federal right to a jury trial. 
Part V examines how these national changes influenced the right to 
a jury trial in New York and discusses other changes to the state 
right. Part VI explains why the proposed elimination of the 
unanimity requirement is an ineffective means of addressing some 
of the perceived problems with the jury system. In particular, this 
section argues that the proposed change threatens to alter the right 
to a jury trial in contravention of the right’s historical protection. It 
further suggests that the amendment may pose serious 
consequences for the integrity of jury verdicts and the rights of 
criminal defendants. This note concludes with suggestions for how 
New York’s legislature might improve the existing jury system 
without eliminating the unanimity requirement and, in turn, 
preserve the jury’s dual role as both a political institution and a 
safeguard of individual liberty. 
                                                          
20 See U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
21 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 2; 
N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2; N.Y. CONST. of 1896, art. I, § 2; N.Y. CONST. 
of 1938, art. I, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004). 
TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC 3/14/2005 2:45 PM 
432 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
I. RIGHT TO A JURY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The right to a jury dramatically influenced the development 
and structure of the American political system. This should not 
surprise, given that Americans enjoyed the right to a jury trial from 
the beginning of colonial times.22 In fact, Thomas Jefferson listed 
the deprivation of the right to a trial by jury as one of the charges 
against King George III of Great Britain in the Declaration of 
Independence.23 A review of America’s early history provides 
insight into why the Founding Fathers perceived the right to a jury 
trial to be a vital component of the federalist system. Further, it 
highlights some of the colonial experiences that shaped and later 
influenced the Founding Fathers’ incorporation of the right in the 
U.S. Constitution. 
A. Coming to America and Finding a Home 
The right to a jury trial fully emerged in England in the 
fourteenth century.24 A typical criminal jury in England was 
composed of twelve men from the local community and required a 
unanimous verdict.25 The colonists wanted to incorporate this right 
                                                          
22 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (discussing the 
colonial history of the jury trial and explaining that the “[j[ury trial came to 
America with English colonists, and received strong support from them”); 
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE (1990); Rita James Simon, 
Introduction, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 15 (Rita James Simon ed., 
1975); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870; Smith, supra note 12, 421-23. 
23 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Jefferson frames the violation in terms 
of the King having allowed others to enact legislation that “depriv[es] us in 
many cases of the benefits of trial by jury.” For a comprehensive history of the 
making of the Declaration, see PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: 
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997). 
24 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151-52; For a brief discussion on the historical 
origins of the right to a jury, see LEVY, supra note 22. 
25 LEVY, supra note 22, at 23, 46. These twelve men should be “persons of 
good character, neighbors where the fact was committed, apprised of the 
circumstances in question, and well acquainted with the lives and conversations 
of the witnesses.” Id. Thus, the vicinage and unanimity requirement were 
defining characteristics of the jury. Levy surmises that the requirement for a 
unanimous verdict increased the authority of the verdict and ensured that the 
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in colonial society.26 Accordingly, they sought to preserve the right 
in early colonial constitutions.27 For example, the Virginia Charter 
of 1606 granted the settlers of the Virginia colony all of the rights 
held by an Englishman, including the right to a jury trial in both 
criminal and civil cases.28 After 1641, the criminal system in 
Massachusetts granted accused individuals the right “to choose 
whether they will be tried by the Bensh or by a Jurie.”29 
Additionally, the Colonial Constitution of Carolina, the Charter of 
West New Jersey, and the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania 
contained similar provisions preserving the right to a trial by 
jury.30 
Colonists viewed the right to a jury as derived from the 
common law, that is, as one of the rights of civilized men to be 
enjoyed by them as a result of their being Englishmen.31 However, 
                                                          
verdict was a true representation of the “voice” of the community. Id. 
26 Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial 
Jury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 24-25 (Rita James Simon ed., 
1975). 
27 See, e.g., MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES 29 (1641), reprinted in 1 BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENT HISTORY (1971); 
FUNDAMENTAL CONST. OF CAROLINA (1669), 1 S.C. STATUTES AT LARGE 53 
(Thomas Cooper ed., 1836); CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF WEST NEW 
JERSEY AGREED UPON (1676), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLINIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3211 (F.N. Thorpe ed., 1906); FRAME OF 
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1682), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR 
LIBERTIES 209-21 (Richard Perry ed., 1959). 
28 LEVY, supra note 22, at 70. The Plymouth Colony also recognized this 
right. Id. 
29 MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES, supra note 27, at 29. 
30 See FUNDAMENTAL CONST. OF CAROLINA, supra note 27 (stating “no 
cause, whether civil or criminal . . . shall be tried in any court of judicature, 
without a jury of his peers”); CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF WEST NEW 
JERSEY AGREED UPON, supra note 27 (providing that all trials shall be decided 
by a jury of twelve men from the community); FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA (1682) (drafted by William Penn), supra note 27, at 209-21 
(stipulating that all trials be by a jury of twelve). 
31 JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
COLONIAL NEW YORK 605 (1970). See also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE 
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 18 
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because of the colonies’ unique political and economic situation, 
the right to a jury became the focus of the emerging power struggle 
between the colonies and Great Britain. As a result, even though 
the right to a jury trial was originally an individual right, it quickly 
became an integral part of the American conception of liberty and 
political independence.32 In fact, the colonists came to view the 
right to a jury trial as fundamental to both their political and 
judicial systems.33 The colonists felt so strongly about the right to a 
jury trial that they included the denial of the right in the lists of 
grievances in the Declaration of Independence.34 
B. The Federalism Debate 
Colonists and the Founding Fathers viewed the jury as both a 
guardian of individual rights and as a republican body representing 
self-government.35 Indeed, the representatives to the Philadelphia 
                                                          
(1986). 
32 LEVY, supra note 22, at 69-70 (discussing the development of the right to 
a jury in colonial Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New 
York). See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 109 (1998) [hereinafter 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (explaining that colonists relied on the jury because 
they controlled it whereas they lacked “control over English Parliaments and 
royal judges”). 
33 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., Random House 
1993) (describing the right to trial by jury as “the only anchor ever yet imagined 
by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution”). 
34 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“ . . . for 
depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury.”). 
35 See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 106 (“jury trial was 
not simply and always an individual right but also an institution of localism and 
popular sovereignty”); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 126-
27 (Richard D. Hefner ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1835) (jury as a political 
institution); Amar, supra note 12, at 1170-72 (arguing that the right to jury 
symbolizes popular sovereignty); Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First 
Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 684 (1996). Amar believes that to the framers the 
jury was “a political institution, embodying popular sovereignty and republican 
self-government.” Id. See also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 876; 
Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative 
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Constitutional Congress all agreed on the importance of the right to 
a jury trial.36 The difficulty faced by the representatives involved 
devising a way to protect the right in a manner that would be 
suitable for both federalists and anti-federalists.37 
Having fought a war for political independence, the former 
colonies needed to develop a system of government that would 
protect their hard-won freedoms while also preserving much of the 
existing local systems of government. The failure of the Articles of 
Confederation demonstrated the need for a federalist system of 
government. Nevertheless, many colonists were wary of having to 
forfeit their hard-won gains to a domineering federal 
government.38 Cases such as that of John Peter Zenger also had a 
                                                          
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 470-75 (1997). 
36 According to Alexander Hamilton: 
Friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in 
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; 
or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former 
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the 
very palladium of free government. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 
1961). 
37 Id. The anti-federalists were wary of placing too much power in the 
federal government and wanted the states to have more control over individual 
liberties. See Essays by Cincinnatus (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 6 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 11-12 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter 
Essays by Cincinnatus] (Cincinnatus is believed to have been Richard Henry 
Lee or his brother Arthur). 
38 This fear is apparent in the debate over a federal judiciary. Hamilton 
alludes to anti-federalists’ concern over judicial review and their fear that giving 
appellate jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court would allow federal 
courts to intrude and obstruct state juries. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander 
Hamilton). See also Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the 
Legislature of the State of Maryland (1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 70-71 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Martin believed that giving 
appellate jurisdiction to the federal courts would result in the elimination of the 
right to a jury trial in both civil and criminal cases. Id. at 70. He described the 
right to a jury trial as “the surest barrier against arbitrary power, and the 
palladium of liberty, —with the loss of which the loss of our freedom may be 
dated.” Id. (emphasis in original). Many at the Constitutional Convention 
thought the representatives did not go far enough in preserving the right to a 
jury, in part because the Constitution also did not mention safeguarding the right 
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profound influence on the emerging political debates in the 
colonies.39 
Zenger was a colonial newspaper editor who was arrested and 
tried for seditious libel for publishing editorials that criticized the 
Royal Governor of New York.40 In one of the first cases involving 
jury nullification, the jury refused to follow the judge’s instructions 
and issued a general verdict in Zenger’s favor.41 During the debate 
over ratification of the U.S. Constitution, anti-federalists opposed 
to ratification cited Zenger for fear that “under Article III of the 
Constitution, the federal appellate courts might overrule a jury 
verdict of not guilty.”42 Anti-Federalists most feared that 
defendants like Zenger would be deprived of the right to a jury trial 
under the Constitution.43 The concern over a potentially dominant 
and intrusive federal government and the desire to protect 
individual rights profoundly affected local political debate and 
influenced the move to fortify the right to a jury trial at the state 
                                                          
to a jury trial in civil cases. One of the main reasons federalists wanted the right 
to a jury in civil cases was because they viewed the jury as a deterrent for 
political and judicial corruption. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander 
Hamilton); Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-12; LEVY, supra note 
22, at 92-96; Amar, supra note 12, at 1169-70. 
39 See infra Part.II.C.1. 
40 For an excellent source for information on the Zenger trial, see JAMES 
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER 
ZENGER (1963). Seditious libel is libel made with the intent of inciting treason or 
other types of action against public authority and includes any acts to defame a 
member of the royal family or the government. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927, 
1361 (7th ed. 1999). Seditious libel is no longer prosecuted. Id. at 927. 
41 ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 101. 
42 Paul Finkelman, John Peter Zenger, New York, and the Origin of the Bill 
of Rights, in NEW YORK AND THE UNION 72, 75-76 (Stephen L. Schechter & 
Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990). 
43 See Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 5-10. In an essay that 
appeared in the New York Journal on November 1, 1787, the anti-federalist 
author Cincinnatus argued against ratifying the Constitution. Id. at 5-6. 
Cincinnatus believed the Constitution did not do enough to protect individual 
liberties because it was “admirably framed for tyranny, that, by clear 
construction, the judges might put the verdict of a jury out of the question.” Id. 
at 9. 
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level.44 
Federalists believed the Constitution would protect the basic 
rights of citizens and that it was an appropriate vehicle for listing 
both the principles of government and fundamental liberties.45 The 
anti-federalists, on the other hand, feared that a strong federal 
government would threaten individual liberties, specifically the 
right to a jury.46 They believed a political system based on popular 
                                                          
44 Id. See also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 104-10; 
Finkelman, supra note 42, at 76. 
45 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, 
ed., 1961) (promising to explain “[t]he additional security which its [the 
Constitution’s] adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of 
government, to liberty and to property”) (emphasis in original). Some of the 
federalists wanted to go further and include a bill of rights in the Constitution 
(The Bill of Rights were later added as amendments). See THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra note 33, at 404-5 (listing “the omission of a bill of rights” that would 
protect fundamental individual rights, including the right to a trial by jury, as 
one of the major flaws of the new Constitution); Jefferson believed that “a bill of 
rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, 
general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on 
inference.” CURTIS, supra note 31, at 20. 
46 Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of 
the State of Maryland (1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 70-71 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). See also Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 
9, 11-13. Cincinnatus believed the Constitution did not do enough to protect 
individual liberties because it was “admirably framed for tyranny, that, by clear 
construction, the judges might put the verdict of a jury out of the question.” Id. 
at 9. He worried that a strong central government would threaten individual 
liberties (like the right to a jury trial), which traditionally were protected by the 
states. Id. at 7-13. 
Our state constitutions have held it [the right to a jury] sacred in all its 
parts. They have anxiously secured it. But that these may not shield it 
from the intended destruction in the new constitution . . . . Thus this 
new system, with one sweeping clause [Supremacy Clause], bears 
down every constitution in the union, and establishes its arbitrary 
doctrines, supreme and paramount to all the bills and declarations of 
rights, in which we vainly put our trust, and on which we rested the 
security of our often declared, unalienable liberties. 
Id. at 13. See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 404-5 (arguing that the 
passage of a Bill of Rights was necessary because otherwise “Congress will 
have the right to take away trials by jury”). 
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sovereignty should place power at the local level.47 Moreover, 
popular sovereignty would ensure that the people would be 
involved in making the laws.48 As compared to the federalist 
structure, the anti-federalist system offered more protection of, and 
security for, individual liberties because it limited the federal 
government’s powers with regard to local issues.49 For anti-
federalists, therefore, the federal constitution needed to reflect a 
political system of government that would protect existing 
institutions and ensure that the federal government would not 
threaten individual liberties.50 
C. Protecting the Right in the Federal Constitution 
The fear of a strong federal government and the belief that the 
right to a jury belonged to all citizens as a birthright helped to form 
the constitutional protection of the jury system.51 The Founding 
Fathers wanted to ensure that the jury remained both a political 
institution and a protector of individual rights. Thus, they included 
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases in the original drafts of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.52 It is the only individual right 
                                                          
47 See Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-13. Cincinnatus did not 
believe the federal government should have power over the states. Id. at 13. 
48 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 208-14 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (discussing how the proposed Constitution conforms to the 
republican principles of government). 
49 See Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-13. 
50 See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004) (noting “the 
very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they 
were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury”). Alexander 
Hamilton alludes to this dilemma in his response to federalist concerns 
regarding the lack of protection in the Constitution for civil juries. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Because the right to a jury varied 
from state to state, the representatives did not want to force the states to 
conform. Id. Thomas Jefferson did not want to leave it to the states and instead 
favored incorporating a bill of rights into the Constitution. CURTIS, supra note 
31, at 18 (“Jefferson rejected the idea that trial by jury should not be guarantied 
because some states have been so incautious as to abandon this mode of trial.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
51 See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540. 
52 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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to appear in both documents.53 This scheme represents a 
compromise between the federalists and the anti-federalists. 
The Constitution sets forth the general structure of our 
government and the republican system, while the Bill of Rights 
provides for the protection of individual liberties.54 Article III of 
the Constitution provides that “[t]he trial of all [c]rimes, except in 
[c]ases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”55 The Framers intended 
Article III to preserve the general idea of the jury as a political 
entity and not as a protector of an individual defendant’s right to a 
jury trial.56 Article III thus represents the idea of the jury as a 
political institution.57 The clause does not mention individual 
defendants, nor does it give any details concerning the 
characteristics of the jury.58 In fact, the Framers included more 
detailed provisions of the right to a jury trial in a draft of the 
                                                          
53 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870; Amar, supra note 12, at 
1169-73. Amar agues that the right to a jury lies at the very heart of the Bill of 
Rights. The right to a jury appears in Article III and the Fifth (grand jury), Sixth, 
and Seventh Amendments. However, Amar also makes a case that the concept 
of the right is found in the First, Second, Fourth and Ninth Amendments. Id. 
With regard to the First Amendment, the jury protects freedom of speech and 
individual liberties. See also infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the Zenger case). The 
concept of the jury also may be found in the Second Amendments protection of 
the right to bear arms. Amar, supra note 12, at 1170. The militia serves a similar 
function as the jury in that they are both “collective, republican institutions” and 
serving in the militia and on the jury were both rights of citizenship. Id. 
54 This is not to say that the Constitution exclusively deals with structure or 
that the Bill of Rights only contains provisions that deal with individual 
liberties. For, as Amar points out, “both the Constitution and the Bill intertwine 
rights and structure.” AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 180. 
However, viewed as a whole, it is fair to say that the Constitution primarily 
deals with structure while the Bill of Rights for the most part contains 
provisions pertaining to rights. 
55 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
56 This argument gains more weight when compared to the detailed rights 
listed in the Sixth Amendment. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, 
at 105. 
57 Id. at 104 (discussing the waiver of the right and arguing the right to a 
jury trial should not be viewed “as an issue of individual right rather than . . . a 
question of government structure”). 
58 Id. 
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Constitution, but these provisions did not appear in the final 
version.59 
Detailed provisions appear, however, in the Bill of Rights, 
specifically, in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.60 The 
Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment to protect the individual 
liberty aspect of the jury.61 The amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation . . . .62 
The Sixth Amendment specifically mentions the “accused” and 
lists the fundamental characteristics of the jury, such as the 
requirement that it be “impartial” and that it be composed of 
individuals drawn from the neighboring community (the vicinage 
requirement).63 The Framers of the Constitution intended for the 
Sixth Amendment to protect the local jury systems from the federal 
government by requiring that juries be composed of people from 
                                                          
59 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1970). The Williams Court cites 
this as evidence the framers did not intend to preserve the common law right in 
its original form. Id. The Court used this argument as a basis for ruling that the 
Constitution did not require states to have twelve member juries. Id. 
60 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
61 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 106-7, 275 (arguing that 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees specific attributes that benefit the accused that 
are not protected in Article III). 
62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
63 Id. Amar argues that the main reason the Sixth Amendment appeared in 
the Bill of Rights was for the vicinage requirement. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 32, at 105. However, the Sixth Amendment also can be seen as a 
representative of the federalist ideal of broad separation of powers. See, e.g., 
Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-13. The framers wanted to give 
states control over the jury because it was a local institution that already existed 
in the states. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Indeed, New 
York incorporated the common law form of the jury into its Constitution 
ensuring that the right would be protected in that form from government 
encroachment. See NY CONST. of 1777, art. XLI. 
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the local community.64 
II. THE RIGHT TO A JURY IN NEW YORK 
Even before the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, most 
states had firmly established the right to a jury trial in their judicial 
systems.65 In fact, the development of the right in New York 
during colonial times greatly influenced the drafters’ decision to 
protect the jury in the state’s first Constitution.66 Through a series 
of lively trials, the colonists in New York came to view the right to 
a jury trial as a symbol of political independence and freedom that 
served to protect them against an often hostile new government. 
These experiences ultimately influenced the structure of the state 
constitution and, thus, are helpful in understanding the origin of the 
constitutional right to a jury in New York.67 
A. Birth of the Right in Colonial New York 
Henry Hudson, an employee of the Dutch East India Company, 
sailed into New York harbor in 1609 and claimed the territory for 
                                                          
64 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 105-6. Amar points out 
that the anti-federalists were strong advocates of the Sixth Amendment’s 
vicinage provision in part because the amendment resolved “the issue of which 
moral community will sit in judgment over a crime.” Id. at 106. Because of this, 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment thus operated as a federalism provision of sorts.” Id. at 
275. 
65 See, LEVY, supra note 22, at 90 (stating that the right to a jury trial was 
already present in twelve state constitutions making it the most commonly 
shared individual right, along with freedom of religion, among the states); see 
also Amar, supra note 12, at 1169 (pointing out that the right to a jury in 
criminal cases was the only right protected in all state constitutions written 
between 1776 and 1787). 
66 See 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW 
YORK (1906). Although dated, Lincoln’s five volume work remains the most 
thorough and complete analysis of the historical development of New York’s 
Constitution. 
67 For information regarding the colonial history of New York, see 
generally STEPHEN C. HUTCHINS, CIVIL LIST AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
THE COLONY AND STATE OF NEW YORK (Gaunt 2003) (1880); 1 LINCOLN, supra 
note 66. 
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the Dutch.68 The British government disputed this claim, as King 
James I had previously granted the rights to this territory to two 
English companies.69 Although the Dutch succeeded in 
establishing a colony in the territory, the British presence in the 
area continued to grow.70 In 1664, under threat of attack from 
British troops, the Dutch surrendered the colony to the British.71 
The British monarch, Charles II, then gave the territory to his 
brother, the Duke of York, and the British renamed the colony 
New York.72 
Upon taking control of New York in 1665, Governor Richard 
Nicolls called for a convention to discuss the state of the law and 
government in the territory.73 At the convention, the governor 
handed down a code called the “Duke’s Laws,” which was 
generally compiled from existing laws and practices in the other 
colonies.74 In addition to providing for a judicial system, these 
laws contained a provision granting the right to a jury trial for “all 
actions at law, and all criminal cases.”75 Juries were typically 
composed of six or seven men, with the exception of capital cases, 
in which twelve jurors were required.76 Through this code, in 1665, 
the right to a jury trial was officially introduced in New York. 
B. Colonial Statutory Development of the Right 
As New York prospered, growing public sentiment and 
                                                          
68 HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 3-4. 
69 Id. at 22; 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 412. 
70 HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 25-46. See also 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, 
at 411-21. 
71 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 421. 
72 Id. at 421-22. 
73 Id. at 423; HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 45. 
74 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 423; HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 45. 
75 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 459. 
76 Id. at 459; see also LEVY, supra note 22, at 74. A majority verdict 
sufficed in all non-capital cases. Id. The provision regarding the size of the jury 
and the one stipulating a majority verdict differed from the English system, 
which required twelve men juries and unanimous verdicts. PETER J. GALIE, 
ORDERED LIBERTY 18 (1996). 
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increased political pressure led the governor to form a General 
Assembly in 1683.77 In its first act, the assembly passed a Charter 
of Liberties and Privileges.78 Approved by the king in 1691, the 
charter provided that “[a]ll Tryalls shall be by the verdict of twelve 
men, and as neer as may be peers or Equalls. And of the 
neighbourhood and in the County Shire or Division where the fact 
Shall arise.”79 The Judiciary Act of 1691 reaffirmed this right to a 
jury trial and stipulated that the jury was responsible for 
determining questions of fact.80 
Subsequent laws passed by the General Assembly maintained 
the right as established by the Charter of Liberties.81 However, in 
1732, the assembly passed a law allowing courts to try individuals 
charged with petty offenses without a jury and, in 1768, a law was 
passed eliminating juries in cases involving the theft of property 
valued less than £5.82 Therefore, in 1776, when the Third 
Provincial Congress appointed a committee to draft a constitution 
for New York, the right to a jury trial already existed as a statutory 
right.83 
C. New York’s Colonial Jury in Action 
An examination of various trials that took place during colonial 
times provides valuable insight into how the colonial jury 
functioned in practice and how colonists utilized the right to a jury 
trial. Specific issues raised in these cases involved the role of the 
jury, its limitations, and its function in society. More importantly, 
these cases help to explain why the colonists in New York came to 
view the jury as both a protector of individual liberties and as a 
political body. 
                                                          
77 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 460. 
78 4 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 39-40 
(1906). See also HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 49-50. 
79 CHARTER OF LIBERTIES AND PRIVILEGES of 1683 § 17 (1691), in 1 
LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 101. 
80 4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 40. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 40-41. This practice still can be seen today in New York. 
83 Id. at 41. See also 1 LINCOLN supra note 66, at 478-79. 
TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC 3/14/2005 2:45 PM 
444 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
1. The Zenger Trial 
The well-publicized trial of printer John Peter Zenger 
demonstrates the jury’s role as a bulwark against an oppressive 
government. No case shaped public opinion about the right to a 
jury more than Zenger’s. In 1735, Zenger, editor of the New York 
Weekly Journal, published several articles criticizing the Royal 
Governor of New York, William Cosby.84 The governor responded 
by directing the attorney general to charge Zenger with seditious 
libel.85 The grand jury thwarted the governor’s plan by refusing to 
indict Zenger.86 The attorney general fired back, circumventing the 
grand jury by using a special procedure to bring the charges 
independently.87 A judge then set Zenger’s bail at an extremely 
high amount; consequently, Zenger remained in prison for nearly 
nine months before trial.88 
One of the main issues presented at trial was the identity of the 
publisher of the allegedly seditious articles.89 Zenger’s lawyer, 
Andrew Hamilton, admitted that Zenger had published articles 
criticizing the governor’s rule.90 By conceding this point, Hamilton 
hoped the jury would consider the substantive issue of whether the 
articles were also defamatory.91 Hamilton argued that the jury 
should decide Zenger’s guilt based on its determination of the 
veracity of the published articles.92 Chief Justice James DeLancey 
refused to allow Hamilton to use this argument because, under 
New York colonial law, truth was not a defense to seditious libel.93 
Nevertheless, Hamilton directed his comments to the jury even 
                                                          
84 Nancy J. King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 41 (1999); see also LEVY, supra note 22, at 79. 
85 King, supra note 84, at 41. For a definition of seditious libel see supra 
note 40. 
86 King, supra note 84, at 41. 
87 Id. See also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 872. 
88 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 872. 
89 Finkelman, supra note 42, at 75. 
90 ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 62. 
91 Finkelman, supra note 42, at 75. 
92 LEVY, supra note 22, at 80-81. 
93 Id. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 62. 
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though his argument directly conflicted with the Chief Justice’s 
instructions. 94 Hamilton hoped to play to the jury’s sympathy and 
sought to portray his client as a victim of a vindictive and corrupt 
government official.95 The judge, however, instructed the jury to 
consider only whether Zenger had published the articles.96 
Disregarding the judge’s instructions, the jury issued a general 
verdict acquitting Zenger, prompting “three huzzahs” from the 
crowded courtroom.97 
By voting with their consciences, the jurors effectively 
nullified seditious libel in New York.98 The judge had instructed 
the jury to apply the law of seditious libel as it was written, but the 
jury chose to ignore these instructions and returned a general 
verdict of not guilty.99 By issuing a general verdict, the jury 
circumvented the colonial government’s attempts to use seditious 
libel laws as a tool to repress free speech. In addition, the jury 
demonstrated its power to protect individual liberties from a hostile 
government through its refusal to apply a law it deemed unjust.100 
2. Forsey v. Cunningham 
The case of Forsey v. Cunningham illustrates the role of the 
jury as a political institution and illustrates how the jury legitimizes 
the legal process.101 This case stems from a fight that occurred on 
July 28, l763, between two New York merchants, Thomas Forsey 
and Waddel Cunningham.102 During the fight, Cunningham injured 
Forsey by stabbing him with a sword.103 For his actions, officials 
                                                          
94 LEVY, supra note 22, at 80. 
95 Hamilton knew that the jury had the power to determine the facts, 
interpret the law, and apply them in this case. ALEXANDER, supra note 40. 
96 Id. 
97 ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 101. 
98 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 874. 
99 LEVY, supra note 22, at 81. 
100 Id. 
101 See Herbert A. Johnson, George Harison’s Protest: New Light on 
Forsey versus Cunningham, 50 N.Y. Hist. 61, 64-65 (1969). 
102 Id. at 64. 
103 Id. 
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charged Cunningham with assault and battery and fined him 
£50.104 The fine did not put an end to the incident, as Forsey also 
filed a civil suit against Cunningham seeking damages.105 A jury 
found Cunningham liable for the injuries and awarded Forsey 
damages.106 
Cunningham refused to accept the jury’s verdict and demanded 
a new trial.107 The court denied his motion and Cunningham 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the Judicature for the colony of 
New York.108 The court rejected his appeal based on the absence of 
a writ of error.109 The court noted that neither party had entered 
procedural objections during the trial and thus concluded that the 
trial was fair.110 
After the court denied his motion for a new trial, Cunningham 
used his political connections and appealed for a rehearing by the 
Lieutenant Governor of New York, Cadwallader Colden, and his 
governing council.111 The court, with the agreement of the attorney 
general, stated that the council’s jurisdiction extended only to 
appeals in cases of error.112 Thus, because Cunningham had 
appealed the verdict on the facts and not the law, neither Colden 
nor the council had jurisdiction over the case.113 
The Lieutenant Governor, on the other hand, believed the court 
could overrule the jury if the verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence.114 Further, he believed that he could issue a writ of error 
                                                          
104 Id. 
105 Id. In addition to medical costs and treatment, Forsey alleged that his 
injuries forced him to miss work. Forsey estimated the total costs to be £5000. 
Id. 
106 HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101. 
107 Id. See also Johnson, supra note 101, at 64-66. 
108 Johnson, supra note 101, at 64-66. 
109 Id. at 65-66. At common law and in colonial New York, appeals were 
only permitted on a writ of error. Id. Defendants could not appeal a judgment on 
the facts of a case. Id. Colden ordered the Supreme Court to explain its ruling. 
HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101. 
110 Johnson, supra note 101, at 68. 
111 Id. See also Johnson, supra note 101, at 64-66. 
112 HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101. 
113 Johnson, supra note 101, at 68. See HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101. 
114 William E. Nelson, The Jury and Consensus Government in Mid-
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and rehear the facts of the case.115 In Colden’s view, justice and the 
law came from the king and as the “King’s representative in the 
Province [he] should function as the guarantor of the liberties of all 
the King’s people.”116 When the council sided with the judges, 
Colden asked the king and his governing council to intervene.117 
The king decided to intervene and issued a rule permitting 
appeals to the governor “from verdicts of juries on questions of 
fact.”118 However, the court considered an appeal of that nature 
illegal and refused to comply with the king’s command.119 The 
General Assembly shared the court’s concerns and explained that 
“an appeal from the verdict of a jury is subversive of that right [to 
trial by jury].”120 The assembly passed a resolution affirming the 
right to a jury trial and reinforced the idea that the governor lacks 
the power to interfere with or to overturn a jury’s verdict.121 
3. The Trial of Nicholas Bayard and John Hutchins 
The understanding of a jury trial as delivering a verdict of 
one’s peers formed the main point of controversy in the trial of 
Nicholas Bayard and John Hutchins.122 Bayard was a political 
activist who lived in New York during the early 1700s.123 He 
disagreed with the colonial government on several issues involving 
taxation, freedom of the press, and governance, and sent critical 
                                                          
Eighteenth-Century America, at http://www.constitution.org/jury/pj/ nelson.htm 
(last modified July 10, 2002) (citing Cadwallader Colden to the Earl of Halifax, 
in 7 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK 682-84 (E. O’Callaghan ed., Albany: Weed Parsons and Co. 1856)). 
115 Johnson, supra note 101, at 69-70. 
116 Id. at 69. 
117 Id. at 71-72. 
118 HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. See also Johnson, supra note 101, at 74-75. Johnson points out that 
political developments may have been the real reason behind Colden’s defeat. 
Id. 
122 LEVY, supra note 22, at 77. 
123 Id. 
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letters to the British Parliament and the king.124 In his political 
debates, Bayard often enlisted the help of his friend John Hutchins, 
who owned a tavern that served as a gathering place for local 
debates and political discussions.125 The Lieutenant Governor of 
New York, John Nanfan, attempted to stop the two men from 
holding their meetings by demanding that Hutchins hand over any 
political manifestos and other documents in his possession.126 
When Hutchins refused, Nanfan had both Hutchins and Bayard 
arrested for treason.127 
In 1702, a jury convicted the men of treason.128 The judge 
subsequently denied the defendants’ appeal on the grounds that an 
impartial jury had found them guilty.129 Regardless, the men 
continued to protest their convictions and appealed to Queen Anne 
of England.130 The men argued that their convictions should be 
overturned because the verdict was in error.131 They claimed that 
the error was due in part to the fact that foreigners had served on 
the jury.132 The men demanded to be retried by a jury of their 
peers.133 The queen’s ministers agreed to set aside the 
convictions.134 Bayard then tried to have the judge “arrested for 
misconduct” for failing to prevent the error, but the judge argued 
that the jury was responsible because it had rendered the verdict.135 
The jury refused to discuss its verdict and the matter was 
dropped.136 









132 LEVY, supra note 22, at 77. Apparently a couple of the jurors were 





TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC 3/14/2005 2:45 PM 
 THE RIGHT TO A JURY IN NEW YORK 449 
III. PROTECTING THE RIGHT: TRIAL BY JURY AND THE NEW YORK 
CONSTITUTION 
As evidenced by practice, the colonial jury did not hesitate to 
demonstrate its independence when pressured by judges or 
politicians.137 By refusing to convict fellow citizens believed to be 
wrongly accused or imprisoned, the jury acted as a bulwark against 
government tyranny.138 However, relying on the jury to protect 
individual liberties and freedoms did not completely insulate 
citizens from wrongful prosecutions. As was the case in Britain, 
most significantly through the acts of government-appointed 
judges, the government continued to wield significant influence 
over juries.139 Judges often exerted pressure on juries to ensure that 
the verdicts they rendered conformed to government policy.140 In 
many cases, the government circumvented the jury entirely by 
creating new tribunals authorized to try cases without a jury.141 
In light of these experiences, the drafters of the New York 
Constitution sought to ensure that the citizens of New York would 
enjoy the unfettered right to a jury trial.142 The drafters of the New 
York Constitution believed the right to a jury trial was a 
fundamental right and sought to codify the right within their 
political system.143 When it came time for the citizens of New 
York to form their own government, representatives believed that a 
                                                          
137 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Zenger trial) 
138 LEVY, supra note 22, at 82, 85. 
139 See LEVY, supra note 22, at 61. During the trial of William Penn, the 
judge threatened jurors refusing to issue a guilty verdict with fines and 
imprisonment. Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 83-86. See also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 875 
(discussing British attempts to reduce the power of the colonial jury). Both the 
Stamp Act of 1765 and the Townshend Act of 1767 attempted to reduce the 
impact of colonial juries by expanding the jurisdiction of nonjury Admiralty 
Courts. 
142 See infra Part III.B. 
143 LEVY, supra note 22, at 85. See also People v. Cosmos, 205 N.Y. 91, 95 
(1912). “The sacredness and importance of the right to trial by jury is attested by 
the arrangement, no less than by the language, of our Constitution.” Id. at 95. 
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constitution would best preserve the right to a trial by jury.144 
A. Due Process and the Right to a Jury 
In 1776, the drafters gathered in White Plains during the 
Revolutionary War to develop a written blueprint for the 
establishment of a government for the future state of New York.145 
In addition to designing a formal governmental structure, the 
representatives sought to ensure that the constitution would protect 
fundamental individual liberties.146 As a starting point, the drafters 
guaranteed that citizens would enjoy the right to due process of 
law.147 Borrowing from the Magna Carta, the New York 
Constitution protected citizens from the denial of their rights 
“unless in accord with the law of the land or judgment of peers.”148 
B. The First New York Constitution 
The colonists’ concept of due process arose from a 
combination of their beliefs in “the natural rights of man and the 
historic rights of Englishmen.”149 Although the right to a jury trial 
was a central characteristic of due process, the due process clause 
of the state constitution did not “necessarily import[] a jury trial as 
part of the process.”150 For this reason, the colonists sought to 
                                                          
144 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004) (noting “the very 
reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were 
unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury”). 
145 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 471-98. The drafters first met in the 
summer of 1776. Id. 
146 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 471-98. 
147 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, §13. See also Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 
378, 432 (1856) (discussing the due process clause); People v. Irizarry, 53 
N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (discussing the due process clause in 
the New York Constitution and its significance to the right to a jury trial). 
148 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, §13. Section 13 reads, “no member of this state 
shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to 
any citizen thereof, unless by law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
149 CURTIS, supra note 31, at 18. 
150 Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378, 425 (1856). 
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expressly protect the right within the state constitution.151 Their 
struggles with the British government had taught them that 
statutory protection was insufficient to preserve the right to a jury 
because the legislature could change the law and judges could 
exert pressure on juries.152 By specifically protecting the right to a 
jury trial in the New York Constitution, the framers hoped to 
protect the right from government circumvention and judicial 
interference.153 
Article 41 of the 1777 Constitution reflected the concerns of 
the drafters. It provides: 
Trial by jury, in all cases in which it hath heretofore been 
used in the colony of New York, shall be established, and 
remain inviolate forever. And that no act of attainder shall 
be passed by the legislature of this state, for crimes other 
than those committed before the termination of the present 
war; and that such acts shall not work a corruption of 
blood. And further, that the legislature of this state, shall, at 
no time hereafter, institute any new court or courts, but 
such as shall proceed according to the course of common 
law.154 
The first sentence of Article 41 incorporates the right as it already 
existed in the colony at the time of independence.155 Although 
Article 41 fails to specify the types of cases covered by the right, 
the drafters clarified the matter in Article 35, which guaranteed 
                                                          
151 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (promising to explain “[t]he additional security which its 
[the Constitution’s] adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of 
government, to liberty and to property”) (emphasis in original). 
152 See, e.g., infra Part II.C (discussing instances in which politicians and 
judges tried to influence the outcome of jury trials). See also AMAR, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 109 (pointing out that “distrust of judges lingered 
on in America”). 
153 People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 533 (1899) (stating that the 
constitutional right to a jury trial and due process “were imposed by the people 
as restraints upon the power of the legislature”). 
154 NY CONST. of 1777, art. XLI. 
155 4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 39. See also People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 
528, 533 (1899) (pointing out that the clause “simply preserved the right as it 
had been exercised before the adoption of the organic law of the state”). 
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that both the common law of Great Britain and New York colonial 
law in effect at the time of the revolution “shall be and continue 
the law of this state.”156 Thus, cases arising under English common 
law and New York colonial law that previously required a jury trial 
continued to receive protection under the state constitution.157 
Importantly, the state legislature could not alter or modify this 
constitutional right.158 
The representatives also drafted Article 41 to prohibit the 
legislature from instituting new courts that did not conform to 
                                                          
156 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV. Article 35 provides in relevant 
parts: 
That such parts of the common law of England, and of the statute law 
of England and great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the 
colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said 
colony . . . shall be and continue the law of this state, subject to such 
alterations and provisions as the legislature of this state shall, from time 
to time, make concerning the same. . . . That all such parts of the said 
common law, and all such of the statutes and acts aforesaid, or parts 
thereof, as may be construed to establish or maintain any particular 
denomination of Christians or their ministers, or concern the allegiance 
heretofore yielded to, and the supremacy, sovereignty, government, or 
prerogatives claimed or exercised by, the King of Great Britain and his 
predecessors, over the colony of New York and its in habitants, or are 
repugnant to this Constitution, be and they hereby are, abrogated and 
rejected. 
Id. 
157 For example, all felonies would be tried with a jury because under 
common law defendants accused of a felony had the right to a jury trial. See also 
People v. Justices of the Court of Special Sessions of New York, 74 N.Y. 406 
(1878). In this case the defendant had been tried before a Court of Special 
Sessions without a jury for assault and battery. Id. at 406. The judge found the 
defendant guilty and sentenced him to four months in jail. Id. The defendant 
appealed and argued that “he had the constitutional right of trial by jury which 
he did not and could not waive.” Id. The Court of Appeals determined that the 
defendant did not have a constitutional right to a jury in this case because jury 
trials were not “used at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution in 
trials by courts of special sessions for the offense charged against the relator 
[defendant] in this case.” Id. Thus, the constitutional right to a jury trial did not 
extend to these types of cases. Id. See also 4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 39. 
158 4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 39. 
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common law rights.159 Specifically, representatives sought to 
prevent the reestablishment of the admiralty courts, which 
historically were created by the King of England to circumvent the 
right to trial by jury.160 This reflected the drafters’ belief that 
common law rules should apply to the new court system, thus 
insulating these rights from “the reach of legislative 
subversion.”161 
Criminal trials in particular were to be “regulated and 
conducted . . . not by statutes, but by common law.”162 During the 
convention, the representatives rejected two provisions that would 
have altered these qualities.163 One provision would have 
eliminated the unanimity requirement for jury verdicts, while 
another provision would have allowed jury verdicts by a three-
fourths majority.164 To the framers, the common law right to a jury 
meant the right to a jury of twelve men and a unanimous verdict 
for conviction.165 Since that time, New York courts have followed 
the intent of the framers by consistently protecting the right to a 
                                                          
159 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (providing that “the legislature of 
this state shall, at no time hereafter, institute any new court or courts, but such as 
shall proceed according to the course of the common law”). 
160 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870-71; See also Smith, supra note 
12, at 424 n.184. 
161 People v. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. 378, 446 (1856). See also People v. 
Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 533 (1899) (explaining that the constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing the right to a jury trial and due process “were imposed by the 
people as restraints upon the power of the legislature”). 
162 Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 446. 
163 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 547. 
164 Id. The representatives defeated the measure by a 28-3 vote. 
165 See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1996) (noting that “[a] legal jury 
according to the common law consisted of 12 persons”); People v. Cosmos, 205 
N.Y. 91, 96 (1912) (stating that “[f]rom time immemorial, a common-law jury 
has consisted of 12 men.”); People v. Justices of the Court of Special Sessions of 
N.Y., 74 N.Y. 406, 407 (1878) (noting a “common law jury of twelve men”); 
People v. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858) (holding that “[a] legal jury, according 
to common law, consists of twelve persons”); People v. Sanabria, 249 N.Y.S.2d 
66, 71-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (stating “this [right to jury] provision 
guaranteed, by implication, a unanimous verdict in a jury trial”) (citations 
omitted). 
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jury trial from legislative and judicial actions.166 
C. Subsequent Constitutions and the Right to a Jury 
New York has protected the right to a jury trial from the very 
beginning of its history. Representatives to the state constitutional 
convention made sure to include the right in New York’s first 
constitution. An analysis of the state’s subsequent constitutions 
reveals that New York’s constitutional guarantee to the right to a 
jury remains relatively unchanged since its original drafting.167 
                                                          
166 See Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 427. In Wynehamer, the New York Court of 
Appeals struck down a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor without a license. Id. 
The Court held the statute violated the constitutional right to a jury trial because 
under the law violators would be tried either by magistrate judges without a jury 
or by a jury of six men. Id. See also People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 3 (1996) 
(holding defendant’s waiver of right to a jury trial was invalid because the 
defendant’s consent did not “conform with the statutory mandate”); People v. 
Davidson, 525 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding defendant’s 
waiver of his right to jury trial was improper as the defendant failed to comply 
with requirements set forth in the New York Constitution). In People v. 
Cancemi, the Court of Appeals overturned a murder conviction because it 
determined that the defendant had improperly waived his right to a jury trial. 18 
N.Y. 128 (1858). A jury had convicted the defendant, Michael Cancemi, of 
murder. Id. at 130. During the trial one of the jurors had been excused. Id. at 
130-31. As a result, only a jury of eleven entered a verdict. The State argued that 
because Cancemi consented to having his case heard by only eleven jurors there 
was no error. Id. at 135. The court held that an individual criminal defendant 
could not waive his right to a jury trial. Id. at 138. The court believed that 
because criminal cases “involve public wrongs,” the State and the community 
have an interest in the proceedings. Id. at 136-37. It should be pointed out that 
Judge Strong believed the court should not allow for juries composed of less 
than twelve in criminal cases. Id. at 135. 
167 Compare N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (providing “[t]rial by jury, in 
all cases in which it hath heretofore been used in the colony of New York, shall 
be established, and remain inviolate forever”) with N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. 
VII, § 2 (providing “trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore 
used, shall remain inviolate forever”), N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2 
(providing “trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore used, shall 
remain inviolate forever”), N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. I, § 2 (providing that “[t[he 
trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain 
inviolate forever”), N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 2 (stating “[t]rial by jury in all 
cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision 
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This is especially significant, given the relative ease with which 
New York’s constitution can be amended. Moreover, this 
consistency underscores the fundamental nature of the right and its 
perceived importance to New York’s political and judicial system. 
1. Amending the Constitution 
The first constitution lacked an explicit clause or instructions 
regarding the amendment of the document.168 Indeed, nearly fifty 
years passed before the New York State legislature succeeded in 
calling for a constitutional convention to amend the 1777 
Constitution.169 Later constitutions expressly provided for ways to 
amend the document.170 As of 2003, the amendment process 
requires a majority vote by the legislature in two consecutive 
legislative sessions.171 After approving a proposed amendment, the 
legislature then submits it to the citizens of New York for a vote.172 
The New York Constitution also requires voters to consider every 
twenty years whether to hold a constitutional convention.173 
Although more than 200 amendments have been made to the New 
York Constitution of 1894, the protection of the right to a jury trial 
in criminal cases has undergone few changes since the first 
constitution.174 
                                                          
shall remain inviolate forever”), and N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004) 
(providing the right to “[t]rial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been 
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever”). See also 
People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 533 (1899) (stating that “[t]he guaranty of the 
trial by jury is substantially the same as it stood in the original Constitution”). 
168 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777. 
169 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 613-29. 
170 GALIE, supra note 76, at 4. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004). 
174 GALIE, supra note 76, at 4-5. Comparatively, the U.S. Constitution has 
twenty-seven amendments, ten of which were added in 1791 (our Bill of Rights) 
leaving only seventeen amendments in over 200 years. 
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2. Amendments to the Right to a Jury Trial 
Although the basic formulation of the right to a jury trial has 
experienced few revisions since New York’s first constitution, 
subsequent constitutions have incorporated various procedural 
changes to the right.175 For example, delegates to the second 
convention in 1821 slightly altered the right by eliminating both 
the references to practices used in colonial New York and the 
prohibition against crimes of attainder.176 However, the delegates 
retained the provision preventing the legislature from establishing 
new criminal courts.177 The right as it appeared in Article VII, 
Section 2 states: 
The trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been 
heretofore used, shall remain inviolate forever; and no new 
court shall be instituted, but such as shall proceed 
according to the course of the common law; except such 
courts of equity as the legislation is herein authorized to 
establish.178 
Courts have interpreted the use of the word “heretofore” broadly to 
allow for jury trials in “such new and like cases as might 
afterwards arise.”179 These courts determined that the purpose of 
the law was to expand a private right rather than restrict it.180 Thus, 
when New York adopted a new constitution in 1821, the right to a 
jury trial continued to receive the same protection as it did under 
                                                          
175 Although the composition of the jury has changed dramatically since 
colonial times, these changes did not occur as a result of constitutional acts so I 
will not discuss those changes here. 
176 See e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 2. 
177 Id. This is due to the fundamental differences between civil suits and 
criminal prosecutions. 
178 Id. 
179 Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 426. For example, if the legislature passes a law 
creating a new felony, a person charged under that crime would have the right to 
a jury trial because under common law all felonies are tried by a jury. 
Conversely, an individual charged with a misdemeanor is not entitled to a jury 
because in colonial times misdemeanors could be tried without a jury. 
180 Id. at 426-27. 
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previous constitutions.181 
At the 1846 convention, the delegates made a single change to 
the Constitution of 1846 and removed the prohibition against the 
establishment of new courts.182 In 1894, New Yorkers amended the 
Constitution to permit parties in a civil case to waive the right to a 
jury trial.183 In 1935, the New York State legislature passed and 
enacted an amendment that eliminated the unanimity requirement 
for juries in civil cases.184 Building on this perceived move to 
reduce the power of the jury, the delegates introduced a provision 
that would allow defendants to waive a jury trial in all criminal 
cases “except those in which the crime charged may be punishable 
by death.”185 
This waiver provision represented the most significant change 
in the right to a jury trial in New York’s history. It also proved the 
most controversial because many believed that the right to a jury 
was so inherently fundamental that it could not be waived.186 In 
fact, the citizens of New York were so concerned about limiting 
the use of the waiver that they passed a second amendment that 
same year imposing several procedural safeguards.187 Following 
this amendment, the state constitution, various statutes, and courts 
required waivers to be in writing, signed by the defendant, in 
                                                          
181 Id. at 427. 
182 Compare N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 2 with N.Y. CONST. of 1846, 
art. I, § 2. 
183 N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. I, § 2. The trial by jury in all cases in which it 
has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be 
waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner prescribed by law. Id. 
184 GALIE, supra note 76, at 205. 
185 N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 2. See also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 
(1930) (waiver of the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases does not violate the 
U.S. Constitution). 
186 See infra Part V.A. (discussing New York’s waiver provision). 
187 People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5-6 (1996). The new amendment required 
that the defendant sign a written waiver “in person in open court before and with 
the approval of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense.” Id. at 6. This 
requirement was necessary because it helped to ensure the defendant had 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her right to a jury trial. 
Id. 
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person, in open court, before and with the approval of the court.188 
In 1938, New York also passed an amendment eliminating the 
reliance on the common law protection of the right to a jury trial as 
it relates to due process, bringing the right completely within the 
constitution.189 More recent changes include the adoption of a 
unified court system and the provision of discretion to the 
legislature in regulating the size of juries in all cases except those 
involving indictment.190 
IV. THE CHANGING JURY 
Colonists and the Founding Fathers believed the jury served 
dual roles in society: the jury was a political body capable of 
enforcing the principle of separation of powers, and it served as a 
protector of individual liberties.191 The Founding Fathers 
recognized the importance of the right to a jury trial and viewed 
the jury as a central part of the American federalist system of 
government.192 Drawing on this understanding of the right, the 
Founding Fathers structured the Constitution to incorporate the 
dual role of the jury in American society and to protect its place in 
                                                          
188 These requirements still apply today. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 
(providing the right “may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases . . . 
by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before 
and with the approval of a judge.”); N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 320.10 
(McKinney 2003); see also Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 11 (reversing defendant’s 
conviction because the defendant’s waiver was invalid); People v. Duchin, 12 
N.Y.2d 351, 353 (1963) (discussing the requirements for a waiver); People v. 
Davidson, 525 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding the 
defendant’s waiver invalid as it did not conform to the constitutional and 
statutory requirements). 
189 N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 2. Trial by jury in all cases in which it has 
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate 
forever. Id. (emphasis added). 
190 Burton C. Agata, Criminal Justice, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN NEW YORK, 257 (Gerald Benjamin & Henrik Dullea eds., 1997). 
191 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (the jury was “a valuable safeguard to liberty” and “the very 
palladium of free government”). 
192 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 442; THE FEDERALIST NO. 
83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
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the federalist system.193 
The Founding Fathers recognized that in order to be an 
effective political body, the jury would have to remain separate 
from the other parts of the government. Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution codified the notion of the jury as a political 
institution.194 Specifically, Article III referred to the trial of “all 
crimes,” implying that the jury forms an integral part of the judicial 
system.195 The Sixth Amendment assured the federal government’s 
protection of the right by securing the individual rights aspect of 
the jury; however, it left the specific definitions and actual 
implementation of the right to the states.196 Implicit in the 
amendment is the anti-federalist view that the states were better 
positioned than the federal government to protect individual 
liberties.197 
                                                          
193 See infra Part I.C. (discussing the drafting of the Constitution to protect 
the right to a jury trial) 
194 Id. Article III states in part that “[t]he trial of all [c]rimes, except in 
[c]ases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.” U.S. CONST. art. III. See also 
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 927 (concluding that “[o]nly a shadow of 
this communitarian institution has survived”); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging 
the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory 
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 48 (2003) (arguing “[t]he placement of the 
criminal jury in Article III highlights that the criminal jury is not a constitutional 
afterthought, but a central institution in the operation of the government”). 
195 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 105 (stating that “[t]he words 
in the Article III jury clause were plainly understood during the ratification 
period as words of obligation”). 
196 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For this reason, juries differed from state to 
state and the right to a jury trial signified different things from state to state. 
King, supra note 84, at 43. 
197 People v. Irizarry, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). The 
anti-federalists believed “[s]tate Constitutions in general, and the New York 
Constitution in particular, have long safeguarded any threat to individual 
liberties, irrespective of from what quarter that peril arose.” Id. (quoting 
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 159 (1978)). See also 
Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 13 (arguing that “[o]ur state 
constitutions have held it [the right a jury trial] sacred in all its parts . . . [and] 
[t]hey have anxiously secured it.”). In fact, before Duncan v. Louisiana, the 
Sixth Amendment only applied to the federal government. 391 U.S. 145, 149 
(1968). The Court in Duncan held the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right 
that falls within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
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Despite the fact that states were not required to protect the 
right,198 juries remained a central part of the local political 
foundation of our country.199 This is not the case today. The jury 
no longer wields such profound influence on our political and 
judicial systems.200 Indeed, an increasing number of individuals 
view the jury as an accessory rather than an integral part of the 
judicial system.201 Furthermore, many people have come to view 
the right to a jury in one-dimensional terms as a defendant’s right 
as opposed to a basic political right of all citizens.202 This change 
has occurred gradually and is due to several different factors, 
including the development of the legal profession and professional 
judiciary, the passage of the Civil War Amendments, various U.S. 
                                                          
198 See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-5 (1900). In Maxwell, the 
Court upheld a provision in Utah’s Constitution providing for an eight-person 
jury. The Court felt the issue of juries should be left to the states to decide. Id. 
As long as states provided a means for which criminal and civil actions could be 
resolved fairly then the Court would not get involved. Id. at 604-5. See also 
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (holding that the right to a 
jury may be waived and that a state may decide to try a case without a jury). 
199 See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004) (stating the 
right to a jury trial is “a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional 
structure” and it “is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary”); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting the jury acted as “an inestimable 
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the 
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”). 
200 See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 97, 109 (stating that 
once “[j]uries stood at the center of the original Bill of Rights, but sit on the 
periphery today” and “the present-day jury is only a shadow of its former self”); 
Barkow, supra note 194, at 34 (stating “[t]oday, however, the jury’s role as a 
check on the government’s power has become far more limited”). 
201 WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIAL WITHOUT TRUTH 216 (1999) (criticizing the 
American justice system for not giving juries more help because “jurors are 
children who cannot be trusted to make . . . decisions for themselves”). 
202 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (holding “the interest 
of the defendant in having the judgment of his peers interposed between himself 
and the officers of the State who prosecute and judge him is equally well 
served” by a less than unanimous jury verdict); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78, 100 (1970) (stating that the “essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the 
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment 
of a group of laymen”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (stating 
the jury assures “that fair trials are provided for all defendants”). 
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Supreme Court decisions interpreting the right to a jury trial, and 
changes to state constitutional protections of the right. The result is 
that today’s jury bears little resemblance to its common law 
predecessor.203 
A. The Diminishing Power of the Jury 
Apart from the overall composition and inclusiveness of the 
modern jury, the greatest change has been the decline of the jury’s 
substantive powers.204 The colonial jury and its American 
successor played an active role in the justice system.205 Until the 
middle of the nineteenth century, juries in the United States 
                                                          
203 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 108 (arguing that “even 
the core role of the jury in criminal trials has seriously eroded over the past two 
centuries”). 
204 For the purposes of this note, I am focusing solely on the substantive 
decision making power of the jury rather than on its composition. I do not mean 
to diminish the magnitude of allowing women and minorities to serve on the 
jury. In fact, a large body of Supreme Court cases deal with this issue. See, e.g., 
Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that equal protection prevents 
a party from using peremptory challenges based on race); Castaneda v. Partida, 
430 U.S. 482 (1977) (holding that Mexican-Americans composing nearly 80 
percent of a county’s population yet only making up 39 percent of persons 
summoned for grand jury duty was prima facie case of discrimination); Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down a Louisiana law excluding 
women from the jury); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (holding 
exclusion of blacks from jury service violated the idea of a jury); Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (striking down a West Virginia law that 
only allowed white men to serve on juries). For an overview of New York’s 
progression and struggle with inclusion, see Frederick T. Kelsey, Note and 
Comment, Gender Based Peremptory Challenges and the New York State 
Constitution, 8 TOURO L. REV. 91, 93-98 (1991). 
205 See Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the 
Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1257, 1264-65 (2001) (stating that 
“jurors in this country played a more active role than they do today”); Smith, 
supra note 12, at 449-50 (noting that the “role of the jury during the course of a 
trial in America originally was much greater than that of the modern American 
jury”); Roger M. Young, Using Social Science to Assess the Need for Jury 
Reform in South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 135, 145-47 (observing that “early 
American juries played a much greater role in determining the law than their 
modern counterparts”). 
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determined both questions of law and questions of fact.206 The first 
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, John Jay, alluded to this 
power when he instructed the jury in Georgia v. Brailsford, a civil 
case, that it had the right “to determine the law as well as the fact 
in controversy.”207 In determining questions of law, the jury acted 
as a check on the judiciary and the government and, consequently, 
wielded great power.208 This is best illustrated by the Zenger trial, 
in which the jury used this power to determine that Zenger’s 
actions did not constitute seditious libel.209 
The power of the jury to determine questions of law derived, in 
                                                          
206 See Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 319-20 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter 
Letters from the Federal Farmer] (stating “it is the established right of the jury 
by the common law, and the fundamental laws of this country . . . to decide both 
as to law and fact.”); LEVY, supra note 22, at 87 (stating that “[w]hen juries sat, 
they controlled justice” and according to John Adams, “a jury could determine 
the law no matter how a court instructed it”); Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-
Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 377, 386-88 
(1999) (noting that until the early 1900’s “lawyers and judges believed that 
juries had the power to declare both law and fact”); Marder, supra note 205, at 
1264-65 (stating that juries could “find the facts and decide the law”); Young, 
supra note 205, at 146 (noting that “juries generally operated as triers of both 
law and fact”). See also United States v. Sparf, 156 U.S. 51 (1894) (Gray, J., 
dissenting). Judge Gray believed that the jury had the power to determine the 
law. 
It is our deep and settled conviction, confirmed by re-examination of 
the authorities under the responsibility of taking part in the 
consideration and decision of the capital case now before the court, that 
the jury, upon the general issue of guilty or not guilty in a criminal 
case, have [sic] the right, as well as the power, to decide, according to 
their own judgment and consciences, all questions, whether of law or of 
fact, involved in that issue. 
Id. at 114. 
207 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794). John Jay was one of the principle drafters of the New 
York Constitution and was one of New York’s leading political figures. 
208 See the discussion of the Forsey case, supra Part.II.C.2; see also 
Barkow, supra note 194, at 34, 49, 54. Barkow points out that “the criminal jury 
was designed to be a part of our elaborate system of checks and balances, 
placing a check on the legislature and executive to ensure that no one received 
criminal punishment unless a group of ordinary citizens agreed.” Id. 
209 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Zenger trial and jury nullification). 
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part, from the fact that juries knew as much about the law as most 
judges and lawyers.210 Early American lawyers did not receive the 
same type of training as their modern counterparts.211 However, 
this parity in knowledge started to change as judges and lawyers 
received better training and more extensive legal education.212 
Although traditional law schools were all but nonexistent in the 
nineteenth century, dedicated law schools became a mainstay of 
legal training by the early twentieth century.213 As the legal 
                                                          
210 See Harrington, supra note 206, at 378-79 (noting the jury had this 
power in part because “few judges in the colonial period had formal legal 
training . . . as a result, the judge who presided at trial did not look all the much 
different from the jury”); Smith, supra note 12, at 449-50. Smith reasoned that 
juries were allowed to determine issues of law in part because of “the perceived 
or actual parity in the knowledge of law upon the part of ordinary citizens and 
the professional lawyers and judges.” Id.; Young, supra note 205, at 146 
(arguing that “because the colonies lacked legally-trained judges, the American 
jury was considered on comparable footing with the judiciary when it came to 
determination of the applicable law”). 
211 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 304-5 (2d ed. 
1985) (stating “[t]he American lawyer was never primarily a learned doctor of 
laws” and “[l]egal education was not very stringent”). 
212 Harrington, supra note 206, at 380 (noting that “[a]s legal education 
became more sophisticated, judges became more convinced that the bench was 
the proper place in which to lodge the law-finding function”). See also Smith, 
supra note 12, at 450-51. Smith points out: 
Often, judges themselves had little legal knowledge or possessed 
limited access to the law. Thus, authority of juries to pass judgment on 
issues of law may have been a peculiar feature of the American system 
that was a result of the ignorance of early American legal professionals, 
and which, therefore, disappeared as knowledge of law possessed by 
legal professionals increased over time relative to that possessed by the 
general public. 
Id. 
213 FRIEDMAN, supra note 211, at 320, 606-7. Friedman tells us that “legal 
training at universities was slow to get started, and well into the 19th Century 
there were no ‘law schools’ as such at universities.” Id. at 320. For this reason, 
“[o]f the lawyers practicing in the United States in 1848, the overwhelming 
majority had been trained in a private law office, or had educated themselves by 
a course of reading.” Id. at 606. However, the rise of the law school put an end 
to that method of learning the law and “by 1900 it was quite clear that the law 
school would come to dominate legal education.” Id. 
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profession developed, lawyers and judges looked to control an 
increasing part of the litigation process.214 Judges became more 
knowledgeable about the law and, thus, were better able to instruct 
the jury on the relevant legal issues. Furthermore, as the country 
developed economically and politically, legal issues became more 
intricate and harder for the average layperson to understand.215 The 
result was that judges and lawyers no longer believed that juries 
could be trusted to decide these complex legal issues.216 The 
                                                          
214 See Harrington, supra note 206, at 422 (stating that “[t]he bench and bar 
thus affected a dramatic transformation in the relations between judge and 
jury”); Smith, supra note 12, at 445 (arguing that “judges and lawyers would fill 
the vacuum left by the erosion in the jury’s power” and that judges and lawyers 
“disproportionately influenced the development of legal principles in the United 
States”). 
215 See Harrington, supra note 206, at 379; Smith, supra note 12, at 445 
(stating that “as legal principles (and society in general) grew increasingly 
complex, the role of the jury in adjudicating disputes decreased”). 
216 See United States v. Sparf, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1894) (stating the jury 
should apply the law as instructed by the court). In Sparf, the Court upheld a 
lower court’s decision denying the defendants’ request to instruct the jury that it 
could find the defendants guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. The Court, 
after a lengthy historical discussion about the powers of the jury, concluded: 
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United 
States it is the duty of the juries in criminal cases to take the law from 
the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from 
the evidence. Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the 
law; upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to 
the facts as they, upon their consciences, believe them to be. 
Id. at 102; Duffy v. The People, 26 N.Y. 588 (1863). In Duffy, the defendant 
appealed his robbery conviction on the grounds that his confession was 
improperly admitted into evidence and the judge improperly gave the jury 
“peremptory instructions upon the legal questions arising on such trials.” Id. at 
591. The court affirmed the conviction and ruled that “it is as much the duty of 
jurors to be governed by the instructions of the court upon legal questions in 
criminal as it is in civil cases.” Id. The court explained its ruling: 
1. The selection of jurors from all classes of the people whose 
education and business cannot, as a general rule, have qualified them to 
decide legal questions, renders it unreasonable as well as apparently 
unsafe to require them to pass upon such questions. 
2. If jurors were to determine the law, its stability would be subverted, 
and it would become as variable as the prejudices, the inclinations and 
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development of the American legal profession and the emergence 
of the professional judiciary in the 1800s thus proved instrumental 
in ending the practice of criminal juries determining both questions 
of law and questions of fact.217 
The development of modern law and criminal procedure also 
has contributed to the reduction of the jury’s power and its role in 
the U.S. justice system.218 One example of these changes has been 
the emergence of the use of plea bargains in criminal trials. 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when plea bargaining 
started to be used in criminal cases, Albert Alschuler and other 
legal historians suggest that the practice fully emerged in the late 
1800s.219 The increased use of plea bargaining led to a dramatic 
                                                          
the passions of men. Every case would be governed, not by any known 
or established rule, but by a rule made for the occasion. Jurors would 
become not only judges, but legislators as well.3. All questions in 
regard to the admission or rejection of evidence, being questions of 
law, are required to be decided by the court. If jurors are to decide law 
and fact, their jurisdiction should extend to these questions, which often 
control the verdict. 
Id. at 591-92 (internal quotations omitted); see also Harrington, supra note 206, 
at 379 (“members of the bench and bar gradually came to the conclusion that the 
jury’s power over law must be restrained”); Smith, supra note 12, at 450-51 
(noting that “there was judicial pressure to curtail the power of the jury”). 
217 See Harrington, supra note 206, at 380, 436 (stating “[t]he drive to limit 
the [jury’s] law-finding function was entirely a judge-led exercise” and “[t]he 
professional judiciary’s desire for symmetry in the criminal law eventually 
diminished the jury’s role”); Young, supra note 205, at 146 (observing that “the 
role of the jury regarding issues of law began to diminish, due in part, to the 
emergence of a better-educated judiciary”). 
218 See Marder, supra note 205, at 1266 (“One concomitant of this 
enhanced role for both judge and lawyer was a diminished role for the juror.”). 
Jury nullification remains one of the only powers exclusively enjoyed by the 
jury. Although quite often viewed negatively, jury nullification exemplifies the 
true values and historic ideals of the jury system. See Nancy J. King, Juror 
Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673 
(1996); Todd Barnet, New York Considers Jury Nullification: Informing the Jury 
of Its Common Law Right to Decide Both Facts and Law, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J. 40 
(Nov. 1993). 
219 FRIEDMAN, supra note 211,at 576-77 (stating that “[t]he beginnings of 
plea bargaining can be clearly traced to this period [post-Civil War]”); Albert 
W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5, 19 
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increase in the number of guilty pleas received in felony cases.220 
As a direct result of the increase in plea bargaining, the number of 
jury trials has decreased dramatically.221 
The development of rules of evidence further contributed to the 
diminution of the jury’s role in the American justice system. 
Through the development of evidentiary rules, judges and lawyers 
assumed greater control over trials.222 Subsequently, juries have 
become increasingly dependent upon judges and lawyers to guide 
them in their efforts in resolving litigation.223 Today, judges serve 
as gatekeepers for the jury by screening testimony and determining 
the type of evidence the jury hears.224 Although legislatures and 
some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have intervened in 
instances in which judges have overstepped their authority and 
                                                          
(1979) (concluding that “plea bargaining did not occur with any frequency until 
well into the nineteenth century”). 
220 Alschuler, supra note 219, at 18. Alschuler cites Raymond Moley’s 
study of guilty pleas in New York during the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
which found that in 1839 only 15 percent of felony convictions were by guilty 
plea, but by 1926 the number had grown to 90 percent. Id. 
221 Id. at 33 (pointing out that “[i]n the early 1920’s, the only alternative to 
a guilty plea in most states was a jury trial”). 
222 See King supra note 84, at 48 (stating judges control the juries “through 
the rules of evidence”); Marder, supra note 205, at 1266 (“With the 
development of the rules of evidence, both lawyers and judges had larger roles 
to play: lawyers assumed responsibility for demonstrating their respective 
versions of the truth, and judges exercised control over the lawyers’ 
presentations and over the verdicts that were supposed to be based on these 
presentations.”); Smith, supra note 12, at 445 (“Thus, the judiciary was able to 
contain the decisionmaking power of the jury by determining what evidence 
could be heard by the jury, as well as by determining what were the issues of 
fact within the purview of the jury, as opposed to issues of law, which were 
within the province of the judge’s decisionmaking authority.”). 
223 Marder, supra note 205, at 1266. 
224 King, supra note 84, at 48-49 (“A judge may not be allowed to tell 
jurors what to deduce from the evidence they hear, but he can prevent them from 
hearing it at all.”). Additionally, with the advancement in forensics and the 
increased use of DNA testing and other technology, judges control the testimony 
of expert witnesses. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) (holding “general acceptance” was not a precondition for admissibility of 
scientific evidence and that the trial judge is responsible for determining 
whether expert testimony is both relevant and reliable). 
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intruded upon the powers of the jury, such intervention to protect 
the power of the jury is the exception rather then the norm.225 
                                                          
225 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (limiting judges’ 
discretionary powers in sentencing). In Apprendi, the defendant was arrested for 
firing several shots into a home owned by an African-American family. Id. at 
469. Prosecutors charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm, a charge 
that carried a maximum sentence of ten years. Id. at 470. A New Jersey hate-
crime statute permitted the judge to exceed the statutory maximum sentence if 
the judge determined the defendant acted with racial bias. Id. at 468-69. 
Therefore, instead of a ten-year sentence, the defendant received twelve years. 
Id. at 474. In ruling the statute unconstitutional, the Court held that “any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury.” Id. at 490. See also Unites States v. Booker, No. 
04-104, 2005 WL 50108 (holding the federal sentencing guidelines were 
unconstitutional because they violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) (applying Apprendi 
and holding the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated 
when the trial judge used evidence not presented to the jury to impose a sentence 
which exceeded the statutory minimum by more than three years). In Blakely, 
the defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping and admitted facts in his plea that 
could bring a maximum sentence of more than four years. Id. at 2534. Instead of 
sentencing the defendant to the maximum 53 months, the judge made “a judicial 
determination that he [Blakely] had acted with ‘deliberate cruelty” and imposed 
a sentence of 90 months, nearly twice the maximum supported under the statute. 
Id. The Court applied the rule set forth in Apprendi that “any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 2536 
(quotations omitted). In explaining the basis for its ruling, the Court cited “the 
need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial.” Id. at 2539. See also 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (applying Apprendi to invalidate an 
Arizona law that allowed the judge to impose the death penalty if the judge 
found one of ten aggravating factors because the factors were not submitted to 
the jury); People v. Errington, 762 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). In 
Errington, an appeals court overturned a judge’s sentence because the judge 
“improperly considered crimes of which the defendant was acquitted as a basis 
for sentencing.” Id. at 525. See also Katie Cornell Smith, Punker Con Up for a 
Big Break, N.Y. POST, Oct. 17, 2003, at 30. Smith’s article covers the Errington 
case and reveals that the trial judge imposed the “harsh” sentence because he felt 
the jurors “disregarded the law in their effort to show Errington mercy.” Id. 
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B. The Civil War Amendments and the Jury 
The Founding Fathers structured the federalist system to ensure 
that the federal government did not encroach upon states’ rights.226 
However, the passage of the Civil War Amendments completely 
altered the structural relationship of the constitutional right to a 
jury.227 Before the Civil War, Americans viewed the Bill of Rights 
as protecting their freedoms from encroachment by the federal 
government.228 The Sixth Amendment provided assurance to the 
states that the federal government could not interfere with the right 
                                                          
226 See infra Part I.C. (discussing the drafting of the Constitution). 
227 See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 110. Amar argues 
that the Civil War brought about a fundamental change in how juries were 
viewed because as a “local body” the jury could no longer be entrusted to 
protect individual liberties. Id. at 110. 
228 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply to the states). In explaining the Court’s ruling, 
Marshall stated: 
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the 
United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the 
government of the individual states. Each state established a 
constitution for itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations 
and restrictions on the powers of its particular government, as its 
judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a 
government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their 
situation and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they 
conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the 
limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, 
we think, necessarily, applicable to the government created by the 
instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument 
itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for 
different purposes.  
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be 
understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as 
applicable to the states. In their several constitutions, they have 
imposed such restrictions on their respective governments, as their own 
wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It 
is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others 
interfere no further than they are supposed to have a common interest. 
Id. at 247-48. See also infra Part.I.B. 
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to a jury trial.229 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether the Bill of Rights applied to the states in the 1833 case of 
Barron v. Baltimore.230 
In Barron, the plaintiff had sued the city of Baltimore under the 
Fifth Amendment seeking compensation for damage done to his 
wharf.231 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, explained 
that the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment limited the states 
was “of great importance, but not of much difficulty.”232 Marshall 
ruled that the Fifth Amendment “must be understood as restraining 
the power of the general government, not as applicable to the 
state.”233 The reason for this was because “[t]he constitution was 
ordained and established by the people of the United States for 
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government 
of the individual states.”234 The states had their own constitutions, 
which provided limitations on their respective governments.235 
After the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil War 
Amendments abolishing slavery and granting the former slaves 
citizenship and the right to vote.236 However, the Northern 
politicians controlling Congress realized abolishing slavery was 
only the first step in the process of breaking down the shackles of 
slavery.237 Congress also wanted to protect the former slaves and 
their newfound freedom from encroachment by the southern states 
and believed the Bill of Rights was the key.238 Problematically, 
                                                          
229 See infra Part.I.B. 
230 Barron, 32 U.S. at 247. 
231 Id. at 244-45. 
232 Id. at 247. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Barron, 32 U.S. at 247 (“Each state established a constitution for itself, 
and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers 
of its particular government, as its judgment dictated.”). 
236 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII – XV. 
237 CURTIS, supra note 31, at 35. Curtis explains that “Republicans had long 
been troubled by the South’s interference with rights guarantied by the Bill of 
Rights” and “in the changed political climate of 1866 Republicans were 
unwilling to tolerate such deprivations.” Id. 
238 Id. at 37-56. The Republicans in Congress saw Reconstruction as an 
opportunity to secure liberty and protect “the rights of citizens of the United 
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however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Barron, had ruled that the 
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.239 Therefore, in order to 
ensure that the situation in the South would not revert back to the 
way it was before the Civil War, the Republicans needed to alter 
the political dynamic.240 The Republicans needed to make sure that 
the principles represented in the Bill of Rights could be enforced 
against the states because the states no longer could be trusted to 
protect individual liberties.241 Instead, the federal government 
needed to intervene to safeguard personal freedoms.242 Congress 
thus intended for the Civil War Amendments to provide a means 
for the subsequent enforcement of the Bill of Rights with regard to 
the states.243 
                                                          
States.” Id. at 54. These politicians believed “the Bill of Rights secured the 
rights of citizens and protected these rights against interference from any 
quarter.” Id. at 37. In fact, they “interpreted the guaranties of the Bill of Rights 
to limit the states as well as the federal government.” Id. at 51. 
239 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
240 CURTIS, supra note 31, at 35. 
241 Id. at 41 (The Republicans especially wanted to protect fundamental 
liberties “against denial by the states.”). 
242 Id. at 55. Senator Richard Yates described the proper role of this “new” 
federal government as that of “a central Federal Government which, while it 
allows the States the exercise of all their appropriate functions as local State 
governments, can hold the States well poised in their appropriate spheres, can 
secure the enforcement of the constitutional guarantees of republican 
government, the rights and immunities of citizens in the several States, and carry 
out all the objects provided for in the preamble of the Constitution.” Id. 
243 Arguably, the difficulty in determining the effect of the Civil War 
Amendments can be blamed on Justice Miller’s majority opinion in the 
Slaughter House Cases. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). Justice 
Miller ruled that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not apply to the States. For this reason the Supreme Court has 
struggled with how to apply the Amendments to the Bill of Rights and resulted 
in the much-maligned practice of selective incorporation based on “substantive 
due process”. For a more complete analysis on the incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,162-71 (1968) (Black, J., 
concurring) (discussing the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights and 
arguing that all of the Bill of Rights should be applicable to the States); AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32; Laurence H. Tribe, Pursuing the Pursuit of 
Happiness, N. Y. REVIEW, Sept. 24, 1998, (book review) (reviewing CHARLES L. 
BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND 
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The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments granted 
the former slaves freedom and civil rights.244 Among these civil 
rights were the right to vote and the right to serve on a jury.245 
Prior to the passage of the Civil War Amendments, only white 
property owners could serve on juries.246 Thus, for former slaves, 
the right to a jury trial and the right to serve on a jury symbolized 
their new status as free citizens of the United States.247 
Republicans in Congress believed the Fourteenth Amendment, 
through its due process and equal protection provisions, would 
guarantee that former slaves enjoyed the right to serve on a jury 
and other basic civil liberties that were represented in the 
Constitution.248 However, to the southern states and many other 
Americans, former slaves serving on juries provided a clear 
reminder that states could no longer deny freedmen their political 
rights outright.249 In an attempt to curtail these newfound 
freedoms, states looked to de-emphasize the political aspect of the 
jury.250 States began to view the jury as a means of protecting 
individual rights, rather than as a political institution, so they 
                                                          
UNNAMED (1998)). 
244 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII – XV. 
245 See U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
246 Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the Jury at a Crossroad: The 
American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 921 (2003) (“In the past, jury 
service was available only to White men with property.”). 
247 Id. (stating “jury duty now takes on added meaning” because it “is a 
hard-won badge of citizenship; it is an indicia of belonging and of counting as a 
citizen”). 
248 CURTIS, supra note 31, at 216-17. 
249 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 271. 
250 Id. (“Whereas the Founders emphasized Americans’ rights to participate 
in government by serving in juries, Reconstructors at first emphasized the right 
to be tried by juries.”) (emphasis added). Amar argues that Congress attempted 
to solve this problem by passing a law that barred states from excluding black 
people from serving on juries. Id. at 273. By basing this law on the Fifteenth 
Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress emphasized the 
political rights aspect of the jury. Id. (“[T]he Fifteenth Amendment, rightly read, 
affirms blacks’ political rights-to vote, serve on juries, and hold office-just as the 
Fourteenth Amendment had affirmed blacks’ civil rights to do virtually 
everything but.”). Id. 
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would not by law have to include blacks on juries.251 This 
emphasis on the civil rights aspect of the jury signaled a gradual 
change in the perception of the jury as a political institution. 
C. The Supreme Court and the Right to a Jury 
Although the American Civil War and the Reconstruction 
initiated the evolution of the modern jury, a handful of Supreme 
Court decisions in the last fifty years have provided the real 
impetus for the changed perception of the jury’s role in society. 
The first major change in the constitutional right to a jury trial 
occurred in Patton v. United States.252 In Patton, a juror became 
sick during the trial and was excused.253 After consulting with the 
judge, the prosecution and the defense agreed to continue the trial 
with an eleven-person jury.254 The jury ultimately convicted the 
defendants and the defendants appealed.255 The defendants claimed 
that they did not have “[the] power to waive their constitutional 
right to a trial by a jury of twelve persons.”256 The Court disagreed 
and ruled that a defendant could waive his constitutional right to a 
jury trial in criminal cases.257 The Court interpreted Article III of 
the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to mean “substantially 
the same thing.”258 Therefore, the Court determined that the 
                                                          
251 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304-5 (1880) (ruling that 
excluding blacks from serving on the jury violated the black defendant’s civil 
rights). Excluding blacks from juries was a common practice in America, 
especially in the southern states. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965) (holding that the Constitution does not entitle a criminal defendant to 
“demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries him” nor 
does eliminating blacks from the jury constitute “a denial of equal protection of 
the laws”). It was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court ruled a state could not 
exclude people from serving on a jury solely on account of their race. See 
Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
252 281 U.S. 276 (1930). 
253 Id. at 286. 
254 Id. at 286-87. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 287. 
257 Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) 
258 Id. at 298. 
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constitutional right to a jury trial did not establish the jury “as a 
part of the frame of government,” but rather as an individual right 
that could be waived.259 The Court’s decision in Patton had a 
dramatic influence on New York, as evidenced by the fact that 
shortly after the ruling was issued, New York amended its 
constitution to allow waiver of the right to a jury trial in criminal 
cases.260 
The Court’s ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana further established 
the concept of the jury as an individual right.261 In Duncan, the 
defendant had been convicted of battery, a misdemeanor under 
Louisiana law.262 Although battery carried a maximum sentence of 
two years, the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial under 
Louisiana law because Louisiana did not provide for jury trials in 
misdemeanor cases.263 The Court ruled that the right to a jury trial 
in criminal cases is “fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice” and, therefore, falls within the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.264 The Court held that the right to a jury 
trial protects defendants “against arbitrary law enforcement” and 
that to deny the right in “serious criminal cases” would violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.265 
The Court reasoned that the right to a jury is “essential for . . . 
assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants.”266 By 
applying the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to the states 
                                                          
259 Id. at 293-95. The Court believed that “it is reasonable to conclude that 
the framers of the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the right of 
trial by jury primarily for the protection of the accused.” Id. at 297. The Court 
did note that the constitutional right to a trial by jury meant the right to a jury of 
twelve people requiring a unanimous verdict. Id. at 288-89 (stating that the 
“common law elements [of the right to a jury] are embedded in the 
constitutional provisions . . . and are beyond the authority of the legislative 
department to destroy or abridge”). 
260 See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the changes to the right to a jury trial 
in the New York Constitution). 
261 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
262 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 156. 
266 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158. 
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through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court focused on the civil 
rights aspect of the right to a jury trial. In emphasizing concepts 
such as fairness and liberty, the Court discussed the right to a jury 
trial in terms of the defendant’s right, rather than the juror’s right. 
This characterization reinforces the perception that the right to a 
jury trial is an individual rather than a political right and, 
problematically, overlooks the significance of the jury as a political 
institution.267 
Following Duncan, the Court ruled in Williams v. Florida that 
the Sixth Amendment did not mandate twelve person juries.268 The 
Court dismissed reliance on the number twelve as “a historical 
accident.”269 It noted that the proper issue related to “the function 
                                                          
267 Furthermore, by emphasizing fairness and liberty, the Court introduced 
an interpretative element into the jury debate, which opened the door to 
eventually limiting the right. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) 
(upholding a conviction based on an 11-1 jury verdict as it did not violate Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) 
(holding that a conviction based on a 9-3 verdict did not violate defendant’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right of due process); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 
86 (1970) (holding that the Constitution does not require twelve person juries). 
268 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). 
269 Id. at 86-89. The Court argued that the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
did not intend to preserve the entire common law jury right in the Constitution. 
Id. at 92-93. The Court based its reasoning on the fact that a draft of the clause 
originally contained common law jury features, but that these requirements were 
ultimately taken out of the final version. Id. at 93-97. I have argued in this note 
that the reason for the streamlined language in Article III is because the Framers 
intended only to preserve the institutional aspect of the right to a jury in that 
clause. See infra Part I.C. It is the Sixth Amendment that protects the individual 
right to a jury trial and which contains references to jury specifications. I believe 
the Founders did not put more specific language in the Sixth Amendment 
because they did not want to encroach on what was traditionally a state issue. 
The jury was a local institution already established at the state level so including 
specifications in the federal constitution would be seen as limiting states’ 
powers. The right to a jury was universally viewed as a fundamental right of a 
free and democratic society so I do not think any of the Framers would have 
envisioned that the states would act to limit it as it existed already in their 
respective political systems. Regardless of whether or not the Court’s historical 
analysis is correct, the New York Constitution incorporated the common law 
right to a jury, therefore mandating a jury of twelve and requiring a unanimous 
verdict. See infra Part III.B. (discussing the drafting of the New York 
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that the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes 
of the jury trial.”270 Thus, because a six-person jury could protect 
the defendant against government oppression, a twelve-person jury 
was not required under the Sixth Amendment.271 
In the Williams decision, the Court refrained from ruling on the 
unanimity requirement, but implied that a unanimous verdict may 
be required.272 This suggestion proved misleading, as a year later, 
in Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana, the Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial did not require a 
unanimous verdict.273 In Apodaca, each of the petitioners had been 
convicted by less-than-unanimous jury verdicts in accordance with 
Oregon’s constitution.274 As in Williams, the Court believed that a 
                                                          
constitutional right to a jury trial). 
270 Williams, 399 U.S. at 99-100. Admittedly, the Court does mention the 
communitarian nature of the jury and the virtue of deliberations. Id. at 100. 
However, the reference to the communitarian aspect was made in terms of the 
fair cross-section representation requirement, another aspect of the individual 
liberty function of the jury. Furthermore, it seems contrary to Tocqueville’s 
democratic institution to emphasize the importance of deliberation, but permit a 
reduction in the size of the jury. 
271 Id. at 100-2. Having dismissed the twelve person jury requirement as 
“an historical accident”, the Court seems to have replaced it with the equally 
arbitrary number of six. Why draw the line there? Why not a five person jury? 
The Court in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1977), considered that 
scenario and ruled that trying a defendant with a five-person jury violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. For a criticism of the Ballew and Williams 
ruling, see Daniel P. Collins, Making Juries Better Factfinders, 20 HARV. J. L. & 
PUBL. POL’Y 489 (1997). 
272 Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 n.46. The Court explained: 
We intimate no view whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an 
indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment jury trial. While much 
of the above historical discussion applies as well to the unanimity as to 
the 12-man requirement, the former, unlike the latter, may well serve 
an important role in the jury function, for example, as a device for 
insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of proof. 
Id. 
273 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding a conviction based on an 11-1 jury 
verdict as it did not violate Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); 406 U.S. 356 
(1972) (holding that a conviction based on a 9-3 verdict did not violate 
defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right of due process). 
274 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406. 
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non-unanimous jury could adequately protect a defendant’s rights. 
The Court rejected the argument that allowing non-unanimous jury 
verdicts would disenfranchise “minority elements within the 
community.”275 In an opinion reminiscent of its decisions in Patton 
and Duncan, the Court in Apodaca and Johnson discussed the right 
to a jury trial with regard to its effects on an individual’s civil 
rights. By focusing on the jury’s role in protecting individual 
liberties, the Court further contributed to the perception of the right 
to a jury trial as solely an individual right. 
Ironically, the decisions in Johnson and Apodaca upholding the 
constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts bring the right to 
a jury trial back full circle to the Civil War Amendments. The 
Radical Republicans wanted to apply the principles espoused in the 
Bill of Rights to the states, but could not do so directly because of 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Barron.276 Therefore, they enacted 
the Civil War Amendments and intended for these new 
amendments to protect individual liberties from encroachment by 
the states.277 Nearly one hundred years later, in 1968, the Supreme 
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for ruling that the 
Sixth Amendment applies to the states.278 
Unfortunately, the Court’s emphasis of the individual liberty 
protection role of the jury detracts from the understanding of the 
jury as a political institution and ignores the jury’s rich heritage as 
a political institution that sits at the center of our federalist system. 
Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation of this right differs from 
the common law right incorporated in New York’s Constitution.279 
It also differs from the jury that existed in early America. In part 
                                                          
275 Id. at 413. The Court did not think any group was entitled to block a 
conviction, only participate in the legal process. 
276 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply to the states). 
277 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 181-215; CURTIS, supra 
note 31, at 57-91, 131-53. 
278 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding the Sixth 
Amendment applies to the states). 
279 As discussed previously, the New York Constitution incorporated the 
common law right to a jury trial which means the right to a twelve person jury 
and a unanimous verdict. See infra Part.III. 
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because of the Court’s decisions, the jury is no longer viewed as a 
sacred political institution warranting constitutional or 
governmental protection. Instead, the concept of the jury as a 
political body is subjugated to and replaced by its other role—that 
of a protector of individual rights. Moreover, except in capital 
cases, the Court’s decisions enable states to restrict the right to a 
jury trial as it existed in colonial times and in common law.280 
Despite the diminution of the jury’s role in the judicial process 
generally, juries still wield significant influence on capital 
sentencing and may, in that context, serve in their traditional role 
as both a defender of individual liberties and a political body.281 
Why distinguish capital cases from other criminal cases? Because 
death represents the ultimate deprivation of liberty and the state 
should protect its citizens from any attempts to deprive them of 
life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness.282 For this reason, previous 
efforts to eliminate the unanimity requirement in New York have 
provided an exception for death penalty cases. Similarly, the New 
York Constitution’s waiver provision, which permits defendants to 
waive their right to a jury trial, includes an exception for death 
penalty cases.283 Indeed, even the Williams Court seemed to 
                                                          
280 See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (no unanimity 
requirement in the Constitution); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (jury 
may be less than twelve persons); Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (right to a 
jury may be waived). 
281 For a discussion on the role of juries in capital cases see Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (invalidating trial judge’s imposition of the death 
penalty as the judge factored in evidence that was not submitted to the jury). See 
also Joseph L. Hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2001). 
282 See People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 300 (1967) 
(discussing the waiver of the right to a jury trial and because the right “was so 
fundamental and so essential to the protection of the defendant’s rights” it could 
not be waived in capital cases). 
283 See N.Y. Leg. Documents no. 114 at p. 30-31 (1931) (proposing that 
“[a]n amendment should be made empowering the Legislature, by general law, 
to provide that verdicts in cases tried by juries may be rendered by five-sixths of 
the jurors constituting the jury in any civil or criminal action except where the 
crime charges is or may be punishable by death”) (emphasis added); N.Y. 
CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that the right to a jury trial “may be waived by the 
defendant in all criminal cases, except for those in which the crime charged may 
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recognize the fundamental difference between a capital case and 
other cases with regard to the right to a jury.284 
A lot has changed in the United States since Jefferson and the 
other Framers gathered in Philadelphia to draft a constitution that 
would serve as a blueprint for the formation of a new government. 
One of these changes has been the marginalization of the jury’s 
role in our federal system of government. Several different factors 
contributed to this change in the jury’s substantive powers. 
Unfortunately, these factors also affected the right to a jury trial at 
the state level. 
V. THE EROSION OF THE RIGHT TO A JURY IN NEW YORK 
The Zenger case, the Forsey case, and the trial of Nicholas 
Bayard demonstrate the profound influence juries had on New 
York’s colonial criminal and political systems.285 However, the 
right to a jury trial in New York was not impervious to the changes 
occurring at the federal level and in other states. Like juries in 
other states, the New York jury experienced an erosion of its 
substantive powers.286 Despite this erosion and the limited 
understanding of the jury’s role advocated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Williams and Apodaca, New York has resisted making 
                                                          
be punishable by death”) (emphasis added). 
284 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (stating the fact that “no 
State provides for less than 12 jurors [in capital cases] . . . suggests implicit 
recognition of the value of the larger body as a means of legitimating society’s 
decision to impose the death penalty.”). 
285 See ALEXANDER, supra note 40 (providing a detailed account of the 
Zenger trial and the practice of jury nullification in colonial times); Johnson, 
supra note 101, at 61 (discussing Forsey v. Cunningham and the struggle 
between the colonial government, the legislature, and the court over the sanctity 
of a jury’s verdict); LEVY, supra note 22, at 77 (describing the trials of Nicholas 
Bayard and John Hutchins and the importance of the vicinage requirement). 
These cases also demonstrate the fierce independence and political spirit of the 
jury that critics today find so troubling. Cf. PIZZI, supra note 201, at 200-20 
(arguing that the jury system needs to be modified and “jury nullification makes 
a mockery of” the justice system). 
286 See Duffy v. The People, 26 N.Y. 588 (1863) (rejecting the view that 
juries have the power to decide questions of law). 
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drastic changes to its constitutional protection of the right to a jury 
trial in criminal cases. One major exception to this consistent 
protection of the right was the addition of the waiver provision to 
the New York Constitution in 1938. A more recent threat to the 
consistent protection of the right to a jury trial is the movement to 
eliminate the unanimity requirement in the New York 
Constitution.287 
A. The Waiver of the Right to Trial by Jury 
The drafters of the New York Constitution believed the right to 
a jury trial was a fundamental right and sought to protect it in the 
state’s first constitution.288 For this reason, New York’s 
constitution protects the right to a jury trial in all felony criminal 
cases.289 However, in 1938, New York amended the Constitution 
to allow citizens to waive this right.290 This proved extremely 
controversial because many believed that the right to a jury was so 
inherently fundamental that it could not be waived.291 In fact, prior 
                                                          
287 See supra note 1. 
288 See infra Part III; See also People v. Cosmos, 205 N.Y. 91, 95 (1912) 
(pointing to the constitutional protection of the right as evidence of its 
importance). 
289 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004). 
290 New York included several constitutional safeguards with this waiver. 
See infra Part III.C.2 (requiring a written waiver to be personally executed by 
the defendant in open court in front of a judge and judicial approval). The 
Constitution also provides for an important exception to the waiver provision, 
which prevents a defendant from waiving the right to a jury trial in capital cases. 
See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004) (providing that “[a] jury trial 
may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the 
crime charged may be punishable by death.”). 
291 See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5-7 (1996) (discussing the controversy 
surrounding the waiver and stating that people considered the right “absolute 
and [one that] could never be waived by either party”); People ex rel. Rohrlich 
v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297 (1967) (explaining that prior to the waiver provision 
it was thought that “the right to a trial by jury was so fundamental and so 
essential to the protection of the defendant’s rights that it could not be waived”); 
People v. Cosmos, 205 N.Y. 91, 97 (1912). “Thus we see that the right of trial 
by jury, both in England and here, is imbedded in the Constitution; and with us 
it is a right which, in criminal cases cannot be waived.” Id. at 97. 
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to the amendment, courts in New York had prohibited defendants 
from waiving the right to a jury trial. 
In People v. Cancemi, the New York Court of Appeals 
overturned the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial 
because it determined that the defendant had improperly waived 
his right to a jury trial.292 In Cancemi, a juror became sick during 
the trial and the defendant agreed to let the trial continue even 
though there were only eleven jurors.293 The court ruled that 
allowing a defendant to waive the right to a jury trial “would be a 
highly dangerous innovation.”294 Furthermore, based on of the 
history of the right and “the constitution and laws establishing and 
securing [it],” the court determined that “any number short of a full 
panel of twelve jurors” would not be tolerated.295 
The court based its ruling on the fact that there is a 
fundamental difference between civil and criminal trials.296 
Providing for a waiver in civil trials does not raise the troubling 
issues involved with criminal cases because in a civil trial both 
parties represent their own interests.297 As Judge Strong wrote, 
“[c]ivil suits relate to . . . only individual rights which are within 
their individual control, and which they may part with at their 
                                                          
292 18 N.Y. 128 (1858). 
293 Id. at 134-35. 
294 Id. at 138. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 135-39. 
297 See People v. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. 128, 135-36 (1858). The court, in 
discussing the waiver of the right to a jury trial and the distinction between 
criminal and civil trials, stated: 
There is, obviously, a wide and important distinction between civil 
suits and criminal prosecutions, as to the legal right of a defendant to 
waive a strict substantial adherence to the established constitutional, 
statutory, and common-law mode and rules of judicial proceedings. 
This distinction arises from the great difference in the nature of such 
cases, in respect to the interests involved and the objects to be 
accomplished. 
Id. This different treatment of the jury based on the whether the case is criminal 
or civil continues today. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004) (“The 
legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not 
less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case.”). 
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pleasure.”298 Therefore, because of this difference, the court ruled 
that “the right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution to affect, by 
consent, the conduct of the case, should be much more limited than 
in civil actions.”299 
More than fifty years later, the Court of Appeals, in People v. 
Cosmos, reiterated that the right to a jury trial could not be 
waived.300 In Cosmos, the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
murder after a jury trial and filed a motion asking the court to set 
aside the verdict.301 The trial court denied the motion and the 
defendant appealed.302 The defendant argued that the verdict 
should be set aside because one of the jurors lacked the statutory 
property qualifications required for jury service.303 The court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision because the issue did not 
“affect the merits” of the case.304 The court also determined that 
the defendant should have raised the issue during his trial.305 In 
reaching this decision, the court discussed the “sacredness and 
importance of the right to trial by jury” and concluded that the 
right could not be waived.306 
The adoption of the waiver provision signaled a fundamental 
shift in the perception of the jury and its role in New York’s 
judicial system. The citizens of New York were sufficiently 
concerned about this shift that they added another amendment 
shortly after the waiver provision that imposed several restrictions 
on the waiver.307 Regardless, the waiver amendment proved to be a 
                                                          
298 Id. at 136. 
299 Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137. 
300 205 N.Y. 91 (1912) 




305 Id. at 104. 
306 Id. at 95-96. The court stated that “the citizen is not only entitled to the 
trial by jury . . . but that in criminal cases in which it has been heretofore used it 
cannot be waived by either party [government or defendant].” Id. at 96. The 
court later reiterated this point: “Thus we see that the right of trial by jury, both 
in England and here, is imbedded in the Constitution; and with us it is a right 
which, in criminal cases, cannot be waived.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added). 
307 See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5-6 (1996) (stating that the 
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significant change to the right to a jury trial in New York. The 
availability of the waiver suggested that justice could be 
administered without a jury. Furthermore, by allowing defendants 
to waive the right, the amendment diminished not only the jury’s 
ability to protect individual liberties, but also the jury’s role as a 
political institution. 
B. The Proposed Amendment 
Although the passage of the waiver amendment proved to be a 
major change to the right to a jury trial in New York, New Yorkers 
still enjoyed the full protections of the common law right as it 
existed under the first constitution.308 This meant that New Yorkers 
had the right to be tried by a twelve-person jury and the right to a 
unanimous verdict. However, some New Yorkers worried that the 
passage of the waiver provision would lead to other changes to the 
right.309 Recently, several representatives in the New York 
Assembly suggested that New York should amend the New York 
Constitution to eliminate the unanimity requirement for juries in 
criminal trials.310 In 2003, New York State Assemblyman Tom 
                                                          
amendment was needed because it helped to ensure the defendant had 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial). 
308 That is the right to a twelve person jury and a unanimous verdict. See 
infra Part III. 
309 See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1996) (citing 2d Ann. Report of 
N.Y. Jud. Council, 1936 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 48, at 100). “Members of the 
former Judicial Council even questioned whether the proposed constitutional 
amendment providing for waiver of jury trial by a criminal defendant would 
suffice to legalize trial by jury of less than twelve men, as well as a complete 
waiver of the jury.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); People v. Cancemi, 18 
N.Y. 128, 138 (1858). “If a deficiency of one juror might be waived, there 
appears to be no good reason why a deficiency of eleven might not be; and it is 
difficult to say why, upon the same principle, the entire panel might not be 
dispensed with, and the trial committed to the court alone.” Id.; People v. 
Sanabria, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (discussing the 1931 
New York legislature’s debate over a proposal to eliminate the unanimity 
requirement). 
310 See Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). This was not the first 
time such an idea has been proposed. A similar amendment was introduced in 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2001. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. 
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Kirwan, along with Assemblypersons David Townsend, Jr., Joel 
Miller, and Sandra Lee Wirth, proposed altering the “long-
standing” right to a jury provision in the New York Constitution.311 
They introduced bill A04469, which provided for the amendment 
of the New York Constitution to allow for “a less than unanimous 
verdict in misdemeanor and felony prosecutions.”312 Under the 
proposed amendment, the New York Constitution would allow for 
a “five-sixths jury verdict in a misdemeanor case and a three-
fourths jury verdict in a felony case.”313 
The proponents of the amendment characterize the bill as an 
anti-crime initiative.314 They argue that the unanimity requirement 
has resulted in a “higher crime rate” and has fomented “disrespect 
for the law.”315 Advocates of the amendment maintain that 
changing the constitution and eliminating the unanimity 
requirement would lead to “more convictions” and, therefore, 
would help to “put more criminals behind bars.”316 To further 
support their argument, the sponsors of the bill point out that the 
federal Constitution “does not require a unanimous jury verdict in 
criminal cases.”317 Thus, they argue, New York does not have to 
guarantee that right. 
VI. A CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSAL TO ALTER THE RIGHT TO A JURY 
IN THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION 
The jury’s role in American society represents the fundamental 
values upon which this country was founded: democratic self-
government and liberty.318 The Framers considered the jury an 
                                                          
311 Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); see also MEMORANDUM, 
supra note 2. 





317 Id. See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (holding that there 
is no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict). 
318 THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 442 (describing the jury “as the 
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to 
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important part of both our political and judicial systems.319 They 
viewed the jury as an independent political institution that would 
act to ensure that politicians and judges followed the law.320 
Furthermore, the Founding Fathers believed the right to a jury trial 
served to protect citizens from government coercion and 
oppression.321 The right also ensured that a defendant would be 
judged by his peers and would receive the benefits of our judicial 
system.322 Indeed, the very structure of the U.S. Constitution 
reflects the jury’s central place in our federalist system and its dual 
role as both a political institution offering citizens an opportunity 
to govern and to learn about the laws of this country, and a 
protector of individual liberties.323 
In light of the jury’s position at the center of our federalist 
system, it would seem that changing the right would alter the 
careful balance of the federalist structure. Furthermore, the 
elimination of the unanimity requirement would interfere with the 
jury’s ability to function as both an independent political 
                                                          
the principles of its constitution”). 
319 Article III of the U.S. Constitution refers to trials of “all crimes,” 
implying that the jury forms an integral and required part of the judicial system. 
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 105 (stating that “[t]he words in the 
Article III jury clause were plainly understood during the ratification period as 
words of obligation”). 
320 See Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 206, at 
320. The Federal Farmer believed the jury, as representative of the people, 
should uphold the law against wrongful politicians and judges. “If the conduct 
of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and change 
the forms of government, the jury may check them, by deciding against their 
opinions and determinations, in similar cases.” Id. 
321 See infra Part I; See also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 
(2004). “Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative 
and executive braches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the 
judiciary.” Id. at 2539; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (stating 
that the jury protects the defendant against an abusive government); Barkow, 
supra note 194 (discussing the jury’s role in our constitutional framework). 
322 In fact, Article I, Section 1 of the New York Constitution states that 
“[n]o member of this state shall be . . . deprived of any of the rights or privileges 
secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of 
his or her peers.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1 (McKinney’s 2004) (emphasis added). 
323 See infra Part.I.B. 
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institution and a protector of individual rights. In addition, the 
proposed changes would discount the significance of the history of 
the right to a jury trial in New York. 
1. The Jury as a Symbol of Federalism 
As support for their argument for eliminating the unanimity 
requirement in the New York Constitution, sponsors of the 
proposed amendment point out that the federal Constitution “does 
not require a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases.”324 
However, comparing New York’s constitutional protection of the 
right to a jury trial to that of the federal Constitution completely 
disregards the fundamental characteristics of the jury and ignores 
the underlying basis for our federalist system.325 
At its core, the jury is a local institution whose judgment 
represents the judgment of the community.326 Given its local 
character, the right to a jury trial should reflect the customs, values, 
and history of the local community.327 In fact, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                          
324 MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 
404 (1972) (holding that there is no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict). 
325 See infra Part I.B (discussing the federalists’ concerns over a strong 
federal government). Even if the jury no longer serves a significant political 
function, it still represents a fundamental right of individual liberty. The anti-
federalists believed that the states were better equipped to protect individual 
liberties than the federal government. Therefore, it does not follow that states are 
fulfilling their mandate to protect individual rights if they provide less 
protections to the right to a jury than federal courts provide. 
326 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring that members of the jury come 
from “the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). See 
also Barkow, supra note 194, at 77 (arguing that “[t]he jury adds a unique 
perspective to the criminal justice system: the views of the community”); Smith, 
supra note 12, at 472. Interestingly enough, Smith argues that it is the 
communitarian aspect of the jury that makes it a source of protection from 
abuses of government. Id. at 473. 
327 See People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 536 (1899). In Dunn, the New York 
Court of Appeals upheld a law providing for special juries in certain criminal 
cases. Judge Gray, writing for a unanimous court, provided a brief history of the 
right to a jury trial and the origin of the right to a jury of one’s peers: 
The system of trial by jury, as it grew up at common law, had its root in 
the endeavor to secure to a defendant a trial of his cause by a fairly 
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Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana, remarked that “[c]ommunity 
participation in the administration of the criminal law . . . is . . . 
consistent with our democratic heritage.”328 In Taylor, the Court 
struck down a provision in the Louisiana Constitution that operated 
to exclude women from serving on a jury as a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.329 The Court ruled that having a jury that 
represented a “fair-cross-section” of the community was a 
fundamental right because it ensured that the whole community 
would participate in the judicial process.330 
The desire to preserve this local and communitarian aspect of 
the jury influenced the drafting of the Constitution.331 This was the 
reason the right to a jury trial appears in both Article III and the 
Bill of Rights.332 However, even though the right to a jury trial 
appears in different parts of the Constitution,333 the actual 
protection of the common law right is fairly limited.334 
Considering, therefore, that both the United States’ political and 
judicial systems are based on a federalist model, it makes sense 
that New York’s constitutional right to a jury trial affords greater 
                                                          
selected body of his equals, rather than by his rulers, or by magistrates, 
or by persons designated by them, and usage finally obtained of taking 
twelve jurymen from the vicinage to judge upon the facts developed by 
the evidence of witnesses. The right was conceded to the citizen of 
having the judgment of an impartial committee, or body, of his fellow-
citizens, upon charges involving his life, or his liberty, or his 
property . . . . 
Id. 
328 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
329 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 
330 Id. 
331 In order to mollify anti-federalists’ concern that the federal government 
would encroach upon the states, the framers developed the federalist system of 
government and incorporated the right to a jury trial into the Constitution. See 
infra Part I.C (discussing the framing of the Constitution). 
332 Id. 
333 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amends. VI-VII. 
334 See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (no unanimity 
requirement in the Constitution); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (jury 
may be less than twelve persons); Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (right to a 
jury may be waived). 
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protection of individual liberties than the federal right. 
The maintenance of a right to a jury trial in New York that is 
more protective than its federal counterpart is also counseled by 
the state’s history. The unanimity requirement has existed as a 
principal component of the right in New York since colonial times. 
By changing New York’s constitutional protection of the right to 
better align it with the federal right, the state would forsake its 
political heritage and turn its back on more than three hundred 
years of history. In addition, eliminating the unanimity requirement 
ignores the underlying reasons for the historical development of 
the right in New York. 
Some critics argue that states and courts should not be slaves to 
history.335 However, New York based its constitutional protection 
of the right to a jury trial on the laws and customs that had 
developed during colonial times.336 The Founding Fathers 
recognized that the states had developed their own political 
systems, so they established a federalist system of government that 
allowed the colonies to incorporate many of their existing laws and 
customs into the new system of government.337 As a result, New 
York’s constitutional right to a jury differs from the federal right 
because it was founded upon the common law requirements of 
unanimity.338 Therefore, the basis for New York’s right to a jury 
trial is fundamentally and structurally different from that of the 
federal right. Consequently, the alteration of the right would 
destroy the unique characteristics of New York’s right to a jury. 
2. Protecting the Jury’s Role As a Political Institution 
Although the jury’s substantive powers have declined in 
modern times, the jury still has the potential to serve as both a 
                                                          
335 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that there is no 
constitutional right to a jury of twelve because “that particular feature of the jury 
system appears to have been a historical accident”). 
336 See infra Part III (discussing the drafting of the first New York 
constitution). 
337 See infra Part III.B (discussing incorporating the right to a jury trial as it 
existed during colonial times in the first New York constitution). 
338 See Id. 
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protector of individual rights and a political institution in our 
society. Alexis de Tocqueville viewed the American jury system as 
providing a means for people to participate in government.339 He 
referred to the jury as “the most energetic means of making the 
people rule.”340 In this regard, early American juries played an 
active role in governance by administering and adjudicating the 
laws of the community.341 The jury served a fundamental and 
integral part of our political system analogous to the militia342 or a 
governmental administrative body.343 Indeed, the American 
political and judicial systems are not complete without the jury.344 
                                                          
339 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 127. Serving on a jury “invests each 
citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they 
are bound to discharge towards society, and the part which they take in its 
government.” Id. 
340 Id. at 128. 
341 Id. at 127. See also Amar, supra note 12, at 1174 (arguing juries involve 
people in the administration of justice and they represent “democratic self-
government.”); George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal 
Jury Trial and The Rights of the Accused, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 804, 806-10 (1995). 
342 See e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 84; Amar, 
Reinventing Juries, supra note 12, at 1170. Amar argues that the jury and the 
militia are “cousins” in that they both were local in nature, born of the right of 
citizenship and represented checks on an overreaching government. Id. 
343 See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: 
Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1417, 1422-23 (1997). Primus argues that juries aren’t self-governing 
institutions like “legislatures or town meetings.” Instead, he argues that juries 
function more like an administrative agency that performs “other-government” 
functions. He bases this belief on the fact that juries do not decide issues 
affecting their own interests and are not bound by their decisions. Id. Although I 
ultimately agree with Primus’ conclusions, I disagree with his characterization 
of the jury. I believe that juries are an integral part of the process and play an 
active role in adjudicating cases. Furthermore, I think serving on a jury has a 
direct impact on a person’s life and that juries are bound by their decisions. To 
argue that the impact of their decision is disproportionate with the impact on the 
defendant and therefore less tangible ignores the overall significance of the 
jury’s role in the judicial process. I think the relationship between the jury, the 
defendant, and the adjudication process represents the fundamental nature of the 
jury and explains why it is such a sacred institution. 
344 See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004) (noting the 
right to a jury trial more than a procedural formality, “but a fundamental 
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New York’s history, in particular, demonstrates how citizens, 
through the practice of the right to a jury trial, played a large role 
in both the political and adjudicative processes.345 In this capacity, 
the jury functions as a political institution and, for this reason, 
serving on a jury should be considered a valued political right.346 
Ironically, by advocating the elimination of the unanimity 
requirement, many critics emphasize the democratic nature of the 
jury.347 They believe allowing non-unanimous rule would conform 
                                                          
reservation of power in our constitutional structure”). 
345 See infra Part II.C (citing examples of the New York colonial jury in 
action). Zenger showed how the jury could protect an individual defendant from 
an overzealous prosecutor and how the jury can act as a political institution and 
nullify laws it considers unjust. The Forsey case demonstrates the role the jury 
played in the emerging political struggle and debate in New York and it 
reinforces the importance and weight given to jury verdicts by members of the 
judiciary and the legislature. See Letters of Centinel (Oct. 1787–Apr. 1788), 
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 149 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 
1981). The Centinel, an anti-federalist, cited Governor Colden’s actions in the 
Forsey case as a reason the Constitution needed stronger protections for the right 
to a jury. Id. Furthermore, the case proves that citizens, especially politicians, 
believed the jury to be an integral part of the judicial process. The trial of 
Nicholas Bayard and John Hutchins shows the value citizens placed on the right 
to a trial by a jury of their peers. The defendants in that case believed their right 
to a jury trial had been violated because the jury was not composed of their 
peers. This case also demonstrates the independence of the jury as it refused to 
disclose its deliberations or to discuss its verdict. 
346 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 106 (stating that a “jury 
trial was not simply and always an individual right but also an institution of 
localism and popular sovereignty”). In his concurring opinion in Duncan v. 
Louisiana, Justice Fortas argued that a “[j]ury trial is more than a principle of 
justice applicable to individual cases. It is a system of administration of the 
business of the State.” 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). See 
also People v. Irizarry, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (pointing 
out that the Committee of the Constitutional Convention of 1938 “expressed the 
view that the jury was a significant political institution”). It is important to note 
that the requirements for serving on the jury have changed significantly in the 
last two centuries to the point where now most citizens may serve on a jury. This 
change helps to understand why much of our society no longer considers the 
political aspect of the jury nor sees it as a political institution. 
347 See Jason L. Riley, Rule of Law: Should a Jury Verdict Be Unanimous?, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995, at A11. In his article Riley quotes Professor Warren 
Schwartz, an advocate of abolishing the unanimity requirement. Schwartz says, 
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with the democratic principles of our society.348 However, 
eliminating the unanimity requirement and amending the 
constitution to allow for a conviction by a 9-3 verdict would 
effectively diminish the jury’s ability to function as a democratic 
institution. This becomes increasingly evident when one considers 
the functions of the jury in the judicial system. 
A criminal jury is more than a finder of fact; it is a microcosm 
of democratic government.349 Early Americans believed serving on 
a criminal jury represented not only a civic duty, but also a civic 
right similar to voting.350 In order to convict the accused of a 
felony, the government must convince twelve individuals, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. To 
reach a verdict, jurors must deliberate and vote. The deliberation 
process and voting are both foundations of a democratic society.351 
The elimination of the unanimity requirement would detract 
from this deliberation process.352 This is because requiring a 
majority verdict instead of a unanimous one would reduce the need 
                                                          
“[I]f one conceives of jury decision-making as a fundamentally democratic 
enterprise . . . it makes sense to inquire as to whether the rule employed in all 
other democratic institutions might be appropriate for this one.” Id. See also 
Amar, supra note 12, at 1189-90 (arguing that “most of our analogies tug toward 
majority rule—legislatures generally use it; voters abide by it”). 
348 Riley, supra note 347. 
349 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J., 
concurring) (stating that the jury administers the business of the state). 
350 Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note 35, at 684 (citing 
Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995)). This view arises not only out of the functional 
aspect of the jury, but also the procedural responsibilities as well. 
351 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 274 (pointing out that 
voting is central to what jurors do and that “in America, ordinary voters had 
always served as jurors”). Amar illustrates these core values of the jury system 
by discussing the significance importance of the Fifteenth Amendment and its 
impact on former slaves. Id. (stating “the Fifteenth Amendment helped restore 
much of the original political vision underlying juries that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had warped”). 
352 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1272-73 (2000) (pointing out that studies have shown 
implementing majority rule “appears to alter both the quality of the deliberative 
process and the accuracy of the jury’s judgment”); Osher, supra note 7, at 1361. 
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for juries to reach a consensus.353 A recent study undertaken by the 
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) reported that nearly 
“twenty percent of jurors” do not “begin to form an opinion about 
the evidence until jury deliberations had commenced” and that 
nearly 25 percent of jurors change their minds during 
deliberations.354 Studies have also shown that once a jury discovers 
it has a reached a majority, deliberations come to an end.355 This 
aborted deliberation process indicates that allowing for a majority 
verdict prevents juries from engaging in thorough consideration of 
the evidence and legal issues presented at trial.356 In turn, 
eliminating the unanimity requirement potentially threatens the 
accuracy of the verdicts rendered by juries.357 
Majority verdicts in jury trials also prove problematic in that 
they dilute the voting power of the minority. Providing defendants 
with the right to a unanimous verdict by a jury of their peers 
legitimizes the judicial process and increases the public’s faith in 
the judicial system.358 Furthermore, serving on a jury allows the 
community to be involved in the political and judicial system. 
Allowing for a three-fourths majority verdict in criminal cases, 
however, stifles debate and renders some juror’s votes 
meaningless.359 In addition, studies have also shown that jurors in 
trials requiring a majority verdict do not listen to or respect each 
                                                          
353 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1272-73; Osher, supra note 7, 
at 1361-62. 
354 PAULA L. HANNAFORD ET AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
Executive Summary to ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 5 (2002), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesExecSumPu
b.pdf. See also HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 63-67. 
355 Osher, supra note 7, at 1361. 
356 Id.; see also Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1272-73. 
357 Primus, supra note 343, at 1432 (pointing out that requiring a 
unanimous verdict “minimizes the potential for incorrect verdicts” because 
“[t]welve jurors are less likely to be mistaken than ten or nine or seven”). 
358 See Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 206, at 
320 (arguing that “the jury trial brings with it an open and public discussion of 
all causes, and excludes secret and arbitrary proceedings”). Id. 
359 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1272-74; Osher, supra note 7, 
at 1361-62. 
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other’s views as much as in cases requiring unanimous verdicts.360 
This is a particularly serious issue when the votes that are diluted 
belong to African-American jurors or other people of color who 
are serving on the jury.361 By reducing the fairness aspect of the 
right to a jury trial362 the elimination of the unanimity requirement 
would curtail New Yorkers’ political rights and greatly diminish 
the jury’s ability to act as a political institution. 
3. Preserving the Jury’s Power to Protect Individual Liberties 
Of course, the right to a jury trial also serves as a safeguard of 
individual liberties.363 Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Thomas 
Paine, described the right as “the only anchor ever yet imagined by 
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution.”364 Similarly, the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana 
viewed the jury as “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge.”365 In this manner, the American jury system 
places the jury in a position to intervene against the government to 
protect a defendant’s liberty.366 
                                                          
360 HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 14; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 
352, at 1273. 
361 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1276-79 (discussing the effect of 
majority rule on people of color and women). 
362 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 398-99 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the unanimity and fair-cross section requirements 
complement each other). 
363 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539 (stating a “jury trial is meant to ensure their 
[the people’s] control in the judiciary”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 
(1968) (holding the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right within the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
364 THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 442. 
365 391 U.S. 145 (1968) at 156. 
366 See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart 
points out that the unanimity requirement “preserves the jury’s function in 
linking law with contemporary society. It provides the simple and effective 
method endorsed by centuries of experience and history to combat the injuries to 
the fair administration of justice that can be inflicted by community passion and 
prejudice.” Id. See also Part III.C.1 infra (discussing the jury nullification in the 
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In a criminal case, the defendant’s liberty is at stake; therefore, 
the defendant should be provided with all of the protections our 
judicial system has to offer. Unfortunately, under the proposed 
amendment, it would be easier to reach a verdict in criminal cases 
than in civil or even misdemeanor cases.367 The elimination of the 
unanimity requirement in a criminal case is, in itself, troubling, but 
the requirement of a lower majority in criminal cases than in civil 
cases is not only corrosive of justice, but also counterintuitive.368 
Indeed, such a rule ignores the fundamentally different dynamics 
of civil and criminal cases.369 
Currently, forty-eight out of fifty states require unanimous 
verdicts in criminal felony cases.370 It is surprising that two states 
do not provide for unanimous verdicts, given that requiring 
unanimity is the surest way to safeguard a defendant’s liberty. 
With a unanimous verdict, in order to get a conviction, the 
government must convince twelve individuals beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. This helps to 
reinforce the fairness of the verdict and ensures that the verdict 
truly represents the judgment of the community. For these reasons, 
New York should reject the proposed amendment, as its adoption 
would undermine one of the fundamental purposes of the jury 
system and hinder the jury’s ability to protect individual liberties. 
Supporters of the proposed amendment to the New York 
Constitution argue that eliminating the unanimity requirement 
would “produce more convictions and put more criminals behind 
bars.”371 Although most people support cracking down on crime, 
                                                          
Zenger trial). 
367 Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (NY 2003) (providing for a verdict of 
only three-fourths in criminal cases and five-sixths in civil cases). 
368 Nor for that matter does requiring a lower majority for felony cases than 
misdemeanor cases considering the potential threat to the defendant’s liberty is 
greater in felony cases. 
369 See People v. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. 128, 135-36 (1858) (discussing the 
fundamental difference between civil cases and criminal cases). 
370 See supra note 5 (noting that only Oregon and Louisiana allow for 
majority verdicts in felony cases). 
371 MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. This argument is quite similar to the one 
presented by the New York Crime Commission in 1931. In its report to the New 
York Legislature, the Commission argued: 
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the provision advocates an improper means of achieving the 
desired result. The amendment assumes that criminals are not 
being convicted because juries are unable to reach unanimous 
verdicts.372 However, studies show that these so called “hung” 
juries account for no more than 5 percent of all jury verdicts.373 
Furthermore, these numbers fail to distinguish between juries that 
hang on conviction and those that hang on acquittal. Therefore, 
there is no guarantee that majority verdicts will reduce the crime 
rate because eliminating the unanimity requirement will also make 
it easier to acquit criminals. 
The sponsors of the amendment provision suggest that offering 
expanded constitutional protections produces higher crime rates 
and “disrespect for the law.”374 If politicians want to reduce crime 
                                                          
Unanimous jury verdicts originated with the jury system when juries 
were empanelled from the defendants’ most intimate neighbors and 
acquaintances. The necessity and wisdom of the unanimous verdict at 
that time could not be questioned. In these days jurymen are selected 
more often because of their lack of acquaintanship [sic] with any of the 
parties to the action or the attorneys. Under such circumstances it 
would seem that the application of majority rule would be proper. If 
there were provision for less than unanimous verdicts it would reduce 
the number of “hung” juries and retrials and mistrials, especially in 
criminal cases. It would place beyond control of a single individual 
who might be actuated by improper motives of determining in a 
capricious manner the guilt or innocence of the person charge with 
crime. An amendment should be made empowering the Legislation, by 
general law, to provide that verdicts in cases tried by juries may be 
rendered by five-sixths of the jurors constituting the jury in any civil or 
criminal action except where the crime charges is or may be punishable 
by death. 
N.Y. Leg. Documents no. 114 at p. 30-31 (1931). 
372 See Hannaford & Munsterman, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that other 
factors may prevent juries from reaching a verdict); Riley, supra note 347, at 
A11 (pointing out that a reason the jury hangs is because the facts do not 
warrant a conviction). 
373 See HANNAFORD, ET AL., supra note 4, at 6 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. 
& HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 461 (1966)). Although these results are 
subject to debate as the methodology used in the study may have been flawed. 
Id. 
374 MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. 
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and increase respect for the law, there are other, more suitable, 
ways of achieving this goal. For example, the legislature could 
invest more resources in crime prevention and deterrence. 
Regardless, even if the proponents’ supposition were correct, 
eliminating the unanimity requirement represents the wrong way to 
go about addressing these issues. Adopting the amendment and 
making it easier for juries to convict defendants will surely come at 
the high cost of putting innocent people in jail. Furthermore, higher 
crime rates and “disrespect for the law” have nothing to do with 
the substantive power of the jury. It is not the jury’s responsibility 
or duty to further law enforcement goals. Rather, the jury serves as 
a finder of fact and a defender of liberty.375 In this regard, the jury 
acts as an arbiter between the government and the defense.376 
4. Alternatives to Eliminating the Unanimity Requirement 
Amending the New York Constitution to eliminate the 
unanimity requirement is an ineffective means of addressing the 
perceived failings of the jury system. The jury is an institution that 
belongs to the people; thus, instead of altering the right to a jury 
trial, courts and the New York State legislature should do more to 
protect it. In fact, considering what the right to a jury means to our 
society, politicians and the public should work to strengthen the 
right rather than diminish it. For this reason, jury reform initiatives, 
such as the one initiated by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of New 
York’s Court of Appeals, represent a more appropriate response to 
the perceived problems with the jury system.377 These reform 
movements primarily focus on improving the efficiency of the jury 
system and on making it easier for citizens to serve on juries.378 
                                                          
375 See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (stating that the 
defendant “has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived 
of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury . . . and that liberty 
interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary 
deprivation by the State”). 
376 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 399 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
377 See Press Release, supra note 8. 
378 Id. The Commission’s initial proposals focus on ways in which the state 
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Thus, instead of reducing the jury’s substantive powers, these 
initiatives focus on “increasing the level of juror satisfaction” and 
look at ways in which courts and state legislatures can improve the 
jury process.379 
If the supporters of the proposed amendment are intent on 
eliminating the unanimity requirement, they might also consider 
requiring verdicts from 11-1 votes. This could help to reduce the 
number of hung juries because it would prevent one person from 
holding up a jury verdict.380 It also would minimize the dilution of 
                                                          
can “help reduce juror downtime and enhance the experience of service.” Id. 
The Commission would like the court system to institute the following: 
- Increase the length of time between successive calls to jury service, 
including additional time off for person who serve on longer trials 
- Implement a stand-by call-in system for jurors who agree to be 
available within 2 hours to be contacted via beeper or cell phone 
- Sanction lawyers who have multiple unexcused latenesses to help 
ensure that cases are heard on schedule 
- Require that mandatory settlement conferences takes place before 
parties are permitted to pick a jury, in order to prevent jurors from 
being used as bargaining tools in negotiations 
- Develop new guidelines to help jury commissioners and judges better 
estimate the number of jurors to call 
. . . . 
- Offer free Internet access for jurors in every facility where possible, 
for use during waiting periods 
- Work to provide parking and public transportation passes for jurors 
Id. See also Mark Curriden, Jury Reform. No One Agrees on Whether The 
System is Broken, But Everyone is Trying to Change It, 81 A.B.A. J. 72, 75 
(1995) (discussing reforms adopted by Arizona that provide jurors with 
“notebooks that include the indictment, jury instructions, witness list, 
photographs of all witnesses, and a section for note taking.”); Dean Narciso, 
Jurors’ Service Painful, Empowering; Some Court Officials are Trying to Make 
Civic Duty Palatable, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 2003, at A1, 
available at 2003 WL 63161040 (detailing the fact that an Ohio court offers 
jurors amenities such as a pool table, internet access, pizza and flavored coffee). 
379 The Commission on the Jury, Interim Report of the Commission on the 
Jury to the Chief Judge of the State of New York 1-2 (2004) available at 
http://www.jurycommission.com/pr2004_11.pdf. 
380 HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 (pointing out that 42 percent of 
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voting, as eleven jurors’ votes ultimately will determine the 
outcome. Furthermore, requiring eleven votes for a conviction 
would serve to better safeguard the defendant’s liberty than would 
requiring only majority verdicts. 
Another option for states considering the elimination of the 
unanimity requirement is to increase the size of the jury at the 
same time they effect this change.381 This would allow more 
citizens to serve on juries, thus providing them with valuable 
exposure to and experience with the principles and virtues of self-
government.382 Moreover, a three-fourths majority verdict from a 
twenty-four-person jury might be more palatable in terms of the 
fair cross-section requirement because larger juries would give 
people of color a better chance to serve.383 Having larger juries 
would also increase the quality of deliberations because it would 
allow for a greater exchange of ideas. As these alternatives 
suggest, amending the state constitution is not the only way to 
institute jury reforms. Indeed, efforts that focus on procedural 
rather than substantive changes to the jury system may prove more 
effective at addressing the jury system’s problems than the 
elimination of the unanimity requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to a jury trial represents a fundamental right in our 
society. It forms one of the foundations of our political system and 
aids in the protection of individual liberties.384 Serving on a jury 
and taking part in the deliberation and voting process teaches 
                                                          
hung juries were the result of one or two holdouts). 
381 See Amar, supra note 12, at 1188-89 (suggesting that those interested in 
jury reform “should consider increasing the size of juries”). 
382 Id. (stating that the size of the jury should actually be increased because 
“jury service is a positive good” and having bigger juries will allow for more 
people to serve). 
383 Id. (“And so the deep inclusionary and cross-sectional spirit of later 
amendments . . . confirms our founding vision of safety in large numbers.”). 
384 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 156 (1968) (stating 
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases is “fundamental to the American scheme 
of justice” and protects the defendant “against arbitrary law enforcement.”). 
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jurors the moral values of civic republicanism.385 For this reason, 
Tocqueville believed that “[t]he jury cannot fail to exercise a 
powerful influence upon the national character.”386 Jury service 
also provides citizens exposure to the principles and virtues of self-
governance and offers them an opportunity to learn about the laws 
of their locality.387 
Although the jury no longer serves the same dual role in 
society that it did at the time of the country’s founding, serving on 
a jury remains a cherished American right. Instead of eliminating 
the right to a jury or dramatically altering the right protected in the 
New York Constitution, critics of the jury system should focus on 
improving the existing jury system. Judge Judith Kaye’s formation 
of a commission to study the jury in New York is a step in the right 
direction.388 Before the New York State legislature engages in a 
rash move to change the constitution, it should review the 
commission’s findings and consider other, less drastic jury reform 
efforts taking place around the country.389 
 
                                                          
385 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 97. Amar believes “[t]he 
jury summed up – indeed embodied – the ideals of populism, federalism, and 
civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
386 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 127. 
387 Id. at 127 (describing the jury as “a gratuitous public school” where 
jurors learn about their rights and become “practically acquainted with the 
laws”). 
388 See supra note 8. 
389 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 12, at 1185-86 (arguing that more of an 
effort should be made to raise the awareness of citizens and teach them about the 
historical origins of the jury); Collins, supra note 271, at 499 (shorter 
instructions and simpler language will make it easier for jurors to comprehend 
the nature of the proceedings); Curriden, supra note 378, at 75; Kelso, supra 
note 7, at 1442-45, 1488-1501 (reviewing various suggestions for reforming the 
California jury); Arizona Governor Sings ‘Jury Patriotism Act, supra note 8 
(discussing Arizona’s “Jury Patriotism Act”, which is intended to make “it 
easier for citizens to serve as jurors”); Narciso, supra note 378; VERA INSTITUTE 
OF JUSTICE, FIVE YEARS OF JURY REFORM: WHAT JURORS ARE SAYING 
(Executive Summary), available at http://www.vera.org/publications (revealing 
that the “pretrial period of summonsing and orientation is inefficient and 
wasteful of juror time”). 
